US Core disinflation stalled in H2; Will Fed cut on Oct 29?
·
US core PCE inflation data indicates broader price
pressure as Trump policy gradually transmits in the real economy with more
tariffs from Aug’25
·
Overall, the US average core inflation (PCE+CPI)
will be around 3.0% vs TGT 2.0% and unemployment rate 4.2% vs TGT 3.7% on
average for 2025
·
After expected 50 bps rate cuts in H2CY25, the Fed
may again go on an extended pause till at least H1CY25 to assess the real
impact of Trump’s uncertain policy
On Friday, September 26, 2025, some focus of the
market was on U.S. Core PCE inflation, the Fed’s preferred gauge to measure
underlying inflation trends. The BEA flash data shows U.S. annual (y/y) core
PCE inflation (Seasonally
Adjusted-SA) increased by 2.9% in August’25 from 2.8% sequentially, in line
with the market expectations of 2.9% and the highest since March’25. The US
core PCE inflation was stalled at around 2.9% on average for the last three
months, against the same levels a year ago.
The US core PCE inflation is still substantially
above pre-COVID (Dec’19) levels of 1.5%, which is also an ideal/actual target
of the Fed, as core PCE inflation always comes around 0.5-1.0% lower than core
CPI inflation due to different methodologies. The Fed targets core PCE
inflation around +1.5% and core CPI inflation +2.3% on a sustainable basis, the
average of which is +1.9% and just below the +2.0% targets.
On a
sequential (m/m) basis (seasonally adjusted), the U.S. core PCE inflation increased by +0.2% in
August’25 against +0.2% in the prior month and in line with the market
expectations of +0.2%.
Overall, after the latest revisions, the 2025
average core PCE inflation was around 2.8%, while the 3MRA is around 2.9%. The
US core PCE inflation needs to go around 1.5% from present levels of 2.8%;
i.e., almost around 130 bps for the Fed’s price stability target of core
inflation of 2.0% on a sustainable basis. The 2024 average core PCE inflation
was also 2.8%, while the 2019 average was 1.6%. The August 3MRA is now around 2.9% vs 2.9% in 2024.
On Friday,
the BEA flash data shows U.S. annual (y/y) total PCE inflation (Seasonally Adjusted-SA) increased by 2.7% in
August’25 against 2.6% sequentially, in line with the market expectations of
2.6% and the highest in six months (since February 25). And it’s still far
above 1.5% pre-COVID (December 19) average levels or actual targets of the Fed,
equivalent to total CPI around +2.3%.
On a
sequential (m/m) basis (seasonally adjusted), the U.S. total PCE inflation increased by 0.3% in
July’25 against 0.2% in the prior month and in line with the market
expectations of 0.3%.
Overall, after the latest revisions, the 2025
average PCE inflation was around 2.5%, while the 3MRA is around 2.6%. The US
PCE inflation needs to fall around 1.5% from present levels of 2.5%; i.e.,
almost 100 bps for the Fed’s price stability target of 2.0% inflation (PCE+CPI)
in a sustainable way. The 3MRA of US PCE inflation is now around 2.6% vs 2.5%
in 2024.
In August’25,
the so-called U.S. super core PCE inflation (w/o food, energy, and housing), the current focus of the Fed, edged up to +2.7%
from 2.6% (y/y) and the highest since February’25. The US super core PCE
inflation was around +1.2% in pre-COVID days (December 19). The sequential
(m/m) US super core PCE inflation surge was at 0.2%.
Overall,
after the latest revisions, the 2025 average super core PCE inflation was
around 2.5%, while the 3MRA is around 2.6%. The US super core PCE inflation needs to fall around 1.2% from present
average levels of 2.5%; i.e., almost 130 bps for the Fed’s price stability
target of 2.0% inflation in a sustainable way.
The 3MRA of
US super core PCE inflation was around 2.6% in August’25 vs 2.3% in August’24.
The
average US core inflation (PCE+CPI) was
around 3.0% in August’25, while the 3MRA was around 2.9% vs 2.0% targets
(price stability). The 3MRA US
unemployment rate was 4.2% in August’25 vs the target (pre-COVID 2019
average) 3.7% (minimum unemployment). The 3MRA of
average US core inflation was around 2.9% in August’25 vs 3.0% in August’24,
while the same for the unemployment rate was 4.2% vs 4.2%.
The Fed
usually goes by a 3M rolling average (3MRA) of core inflation (PCE+CPI) for any
important policy move. The 3MRA of average core inflation is now
around 2.9%, while the unemployment rate is 4.2% against the target of 2.0% and
3.7% respectively. Usually, the Fed considers 4.0% average levels (orange line
zone) as minimum unemployment; i.e., maximum employment (96% of the available
work/labor force), sustainable in the longer run. But the Fed also considers a
3.5-3.7% unemployment rate as the minimum (green line zone), below which there
may be a risk of inflation while a 4.8-5.0% unemployment rate may be a red line
zone for the Fed, above which there would be a risk of an all-out economic
slowdown (hard landing) or even a recession (if sustained over a few months).
For any economy, a below 5% unemployment rate is considered a sign of maximum
(sustainable) employment.
As the Fed now needs to bring down average core
inflation by around 90 bps to 2.0% and the unemployment rate by 40 bps to 3.7%,
it’s maintaining that price stability side of the dual mandate is facing more
upside risk than employment. In 2026, the Fed will try to bring down average
core inflation towards 2.5% from present levels of 3.0% by keeping the average
unemployment rate at least around 4.0%; thus Fed may cut only 50 bps each in
late 2025 against 100 bps in late 2024 and may not cut another 50 bps in 2026,
if average US core inflation further surges to 3.5% in 2026 due to Trumpflation
(higher tariffs and tight labor market/lower supply of labor force due to
Trump’s immigration policies).
In brief, for the achievement of dual mandate
(minimum price stability and maximum employment/minimum unemployment), the Fed
now needs to bring down average core inflation (PCE+CPI) to around 2.0% from
the present levels of +3.0% without allowing the average unemployment rate to
be materially above 4.5%. If the unemployment rate surges above 4.5%, then the
Fed may go for a more rapid dialing back of the restrictive rate (deeper rate
cuts), while 3.5-3.7% unemployment levels would be consistent with 2.0% core
inflation price stability targets and 3.00% longer-term Fed terminal/neutral
rate.
Although
the Fed targets +2.0% core PCE inflation officially as a price stability
target, in reality, it’s usually +1.5% on average due to a 0.5% lower spread
with core CPI inflation. Fed's price stability target is just below
2.0% inflation on a durable basis. The Fed generally targets average core
inflation (PCE+CPI) +1.9%-as core PCE inflation is generally 0.5% lower than
core CPI. In reality, the Fed targets 1.5% core PCE and 2.3% core CPI for
average core inflation at around +1.9%, but may never publicly acknowledge it
to suit its narrative and change of goal posts as per evolving economic
situations or financial conditions. Now, the Fed is adopting flexible targets
for both core inflation (say 2.0-3.0%) and unemployment rate (say 3.5-4.5%) in
the short term (1-2 years). The Fed will operate its monetary policy with
flexibility; when the unemployment rate (3MRA) surges above 4.5%, it will
prioritize the employment side of the mandate; similarly, when 3MRA core
inflation (CPI+PCE) surges above 3.0%, it will focus on the price stability
side of the dual mandate.
Thus, the Fed's average targets for
the Fed’s dual mandate for 2026-27
·
Bring down average Core inflation (PCE+CPI)
to target 2.0%, vs current 3MRA 3.0% (2025)
·
Unemployment targets 3.7% (green line), vs
current 3MRA 4.2% (2025)
Post-COVID, the Fed may maintain a
real positive rate between 1.00-2.00% as per underlying
economic conditions; for 2025, as core disinflation almost stalled after
H2CY25, the Fed may prefer to maintain an average real interest rate around
+1.00% against +1.00% in 2023 (wrt to average core CPI inflation). The average
US core inflation (PCE+CPI) was around 3.1% in 2024 and is expected to be
around the same level in 2025. Thus, the overall core disinflation process may
have stalled due to the gradual transmission of higher Trump tariffs into the
real economy. In 2023, there was a good pace of core disinflation amid
post-COVID supply chain restoration and a higher supply of labor
force/immigrants (no COVID-related restrictions).
The US
has to increase the supply capacity of the economy for durable price stability:
Although the Fed targets core PCE and core CPI
inflation, in the longer run, it
ensures both core and total PCE and CPI inflation are around 1.5% and 2.3%
respectively, averaging a 2% inflation mandate by the US Congress. Fed needs to
ensure 2% price stability on a sustainable basis in the medium to longer run as
the price stability target.
The general US public is now extremely unhappy
about elevated price levels, almost 25% higher than pre-COVID days; people are
more concerned about the higher cost of living or higher prices of even
day-to-day grocery goods & services rather than the rate of increase
(inflation). The US government of the day also needs to ensure proper policies
are in place for a smooth global supply chain from a low-cost, but efficient
manufacturing hub like China, without which most ordinary Americans just can’t
survive.
Also, the US, at present, needs to develop a huge
industrial and logistical ecosystem to compete with mighty China, the world’s
number one factory house, which may not be possible instantly. The US needs to
increase the supply capacity of the economy, including housing and also other
social and traditional/transport infra, to match increasing demand amid
increasing immigrants/population and price stability. The Fed can’t control
demand and manage inflation forever with its monetary policy through
adjustments of interest rates and money supply.
The US is a country of global immigration, which
also helps it become a major innovator and service-oriented economy. Also,
semi-skilled/unskilled immigrants from South America, South Africa, South Asia,
and other poorer countries are essential for low-skilled jobs like hotels &
restaurants, farming, agriculture, etc. If Trump indeed doubles down on his
immigration policies and causes huge deportations of around 10/11M so-called
illegal immigrants in the country, it may cause a severe labor shortage,
resulting in a tighter labor market and higher wages/normal inflation. Overall, Trump’s tariff and immigration
policies may cause both demand & supply shocks for the US economy in 2026,
unless Trump relents and scales back.
Difference
between CPI and PCE inflation in the US:
In the US, Core CPI (Consumer Price Index) and Core
PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures) are two different measures of inflation
used to gauge price changes in the economy, as well as any change in consumer
consumption behavior after any meaningful change in prices (excluding food and
energy prices due to their volatility).
The key
differences between US Core CPI and Core PCE inflation are:
·
Core CPI
measures the change in the prices of a fixed basket of goods and services
purchased by households (out of pocket), while Core PCE measures the change in
prices of variable goods and services consumed by individuals (both excluding
food and energy).
·
Core CPI focuses
on the price changes of a fixed basket of goods and services typically consumed
by urban households, while Core PCE has a broader scope, including all goods
and services consumed by households, and adjusts for changes in consumer
behavior in line with any significant price changes (e.g., substitution
effects).
·
The Core PCE, on
the other hand, includes a broader range of expenditures. It accounts not only
for out-of-pocket expenses but also for various goods and services paid for by
third parties, such as employer-provided health insurance. This means that the
PCE captures a wider array of consumer spending and includes expenditures by
non-profit institutions as well.
·
The CPI uses a
specific formula, which is based on a fixed basket of goods. This means it does
not adjust for changes in consumer behavior in response to price changes. For
example, if the price of beef rises, the CPI does not account for consumers switching
to chicken.
·
The PCE employs
a Fisher ideal index formula, which allows for substitutions between items as
their relative prices change. This flexibility typically results in a smoother
inflation rate, as it reflects changing consumer preferences more accurately. For
example, if the price of beef rises, the CPI does not account for consumers switching
to chicken, but the PCE does
·
The weights
assigned to different categories in the CPI are based on a fixed survey of
consumer spending patterns. These weights are updated less frequently, which
can lead to discrepancies over time as consumer behavior shifts.
·
The PCE updates
its weights more regularly based on current expenditure data, reflecting more
recent consumer spending habits. This results in a more dynamic representation
of inflation as it adapts to changes in consumption patterns.
·
Historically,
the Core CPI tends to report higher inflation rates compared to the Core PCE.
For instance, since 2000, the average annual PCE inflation has been about 0.5%
points lower than that of the CPI. This difference can be attributed to the
broader scope and more adaptive nature of the PCE, which captures the effects
of consumer substitution more effectively.
·
Both the Core
CPI and Core PCE are essential for understanding underlying inflation trends in
the U.S. economy.
·
The Fed prefers
Core PCE because it provides a more comprehensive view of inflation and better
captures changes in consumer behavior.
·
For price
stability, the Fed eventually tries to converge both core and total inflation
to the same levels; i.e., both core CPI and total CPI around +2.3%, and core PCE and total PCE inflation +1.5%
for a longer run.
Why are the
US core PCE and CPI inflation now converging?
The convergence of Core Personal Consumption
Expenditures (PCE) and Core Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation rates to
around 3% in July 2025, with Core PCE at 2.9% and Core CPI at 3.1% (y/y), marks
a notable shift from the historical trend where Core PCE typically ran about
0.5%-1.0% lower than Core CPI. This phenomenon can be attributed to a
combination of methodological differences, economic factors, and recent
inflation data dynamics.
Methodological
Differences between Core PCE and Core CPI
Weighting
and Basket Composition:
·
Core PCE:
Excludes volatile food and energy prices and uses a chain-weighted index, which
adjusts expenditure weights monthly to reflect changes in consumer behavior
(e.g., substituting cheaper goods when prices rise). It includes a broader
range of expenditures, such as those made on behalf of consumers (e.g.,
employer-provided health insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid). Healthcare has a
higher weight in PCE (about 20%) compared to CPI (about 8%).
·
Core CPI: Uses
fixed weights based on consumer surveys, updated every two years, and measures
out-of-pocket household expenses. It includes a large component of
owner-equivalent rent (OER), which accounts for about 30% of the index, unlike
PCE, which has a smaller housing component.
·
Historical Gap:
From 1995 to 2013, Core PCE inflation averaged about 0.4% lower than Core CPI
due to these differences, particularly PCE’s ability to account for
substitution and its inclusion of third-party expenditures, which tend to be
less volatile. For example, CPI’s heavy OER weighting often amplifies
housing-related price changes, while PCE’s broader healthcare coverage smooths
volatility.
Recent
Economic Factors Driving Convergence
·
Healthcare Price Dynamics: In 2025, healthcare prices, particularly hospital
services and insurance, will have been a significant driver of inflation. Since
PCE includes employer-sponsored and government-funded healthcare (unlike CPI,
which only captures out-of-pocket costs), a surge in healthcare costs narrows
the gap. Recent data suggest hospital service prices rose sharply, contributing
to PCE’s increase. For instance, the Cleveland Fed noted that healthcare
components in PCE have been less volatile recently, aligning PCE closer to CPI.
In July 2025, Core CPI’s healthcare component rose modestly (e.g., medical care
services up 0.3%), while PCE’s broader healthcare inclusion captured similar
price pressures, reducing the historical gap.
·
Housing and Shelter Costs: CPI’s large OER component typically drives higher
readings during periods of rising rent or housing costs. However, in 2025,
shelter inflation has moderated slightly, with CPI’s shelter index rising 0.4%
month-over-month in July, compared to stronger increases in prior years. This
slowdown reduces CPI’s upward bias relative to PCE, which has a smaller housing
weight.
·
Tariff-Induced Price Pressures: The Trump administration’s tariffs, implemented in
2025, have increased goods prices, particularly for imported items like
electronics and apparel. Since PCE captures a broader range of goods and
adjusts for substitution, it reflects these price increases more dynamically
than CPI’s fixed basket. This has pushed Core PCE closer to Core CPI, as both
indices capture tariff-driven price hikes in core goods.
The narrow 0.2% gap contrasts with the historical
0.5% average, as both indices reflect similar pressures from services (e.g.,
healthcare, insurance) and goods affected by tariffs. PCE data is revised
monthly and annually to incorporate new data and methodologies, making it more
adaptive to current economic conditions. For example, the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) revised the July 2025 PCE data to reflect updated business
survey inputs, which may have captured price increases more in line with CPI’s
consumer survey-based data. CPI, by contrast, is not revised, potentially
causing it to lag in reflecting rapid shifts. Both indices indicate persistent
inflation above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target, driven by services and
tariff-related goods price increases. The Cleveland Fed’s Median PCE inflation
rate, at 2.65% in July, suggests a slightly lower underlying trend, but the
alignment of Core PCE and Core CPI near 3% reflects broad-based price
pressures.
The Fed prioritizes Core PCE for its substitution
adjustments and comprehensive coverage, but the convergence with Core CPI
suggests that both measures are capturing similar inflationary trends, reducing
discrepancies in policy signals. This alignment may reinforce expectations of
cautious rate cuts in September 2025, as markets anticipate an ~90% chance of a
25-basis-point cut, but another potential 25-bps rate cut is still uncertain.
Substitution
Effect: Historically, PCE’s
chain-weighting captures consumer shifts to cheaper alternatives, lowering its
readings. In 2025, however, substitution may be limited due to widespread price
increases (e.g., tariffs, healthcare), aligning PCE closer to CPI’s
fixed-basket approach.
Reduced
Volatility in Volatile Components:
While both Core PCE and Core CPI exclude food and
energy, other volatile components (e.g., healthcare, transportation services)
have shown less divergence in 2025. For instance, transportation services in
CPI rose 0.5% MoM in July, while PCE’s broader service categories reflected
similar trends, minimizing the gap. Recent improvements in BEA’s business
survey data for PCE, combined with CPI’s consumer survey updates, may have aligned
price measurements more closely, especially for services like healthcare and
insurance, which have been key inflation drivers in 2025. Tariff-related price
increases and supply chain disruptions in 2025 have affected both indices
similarly, reducing the substitution-driven divergence typically seen in PCE.
Primary
reasons behind stalled core disinflation in the US
The average rate of core disinflation was around
-0.2% per month in 2023, which was reduced to -0.1% per month in 2024. In 2023,
the rapid pace of disinflation was due to the easing of the supply
chain/constraints and also the supply of more workers/labor force amid huge
immigration (legal/illegal). But the main effect of those easing in the supply
chain (goods & labor/service) may be already over by 2023 (after withdrawal
of all types of COVID restrictions by late 2022), and thus we have seen
comparatively slow, but predictable disinflation in 2024, although often
stalled.
In 2024, disinflation partly stalled due to higher
demand from an increasing population/immigration; also, demand for housing,
especially rented homes, is high, resulting in elevated rent/housing inflation.
This, along with increasing geopolitical and global trade/supply chain
fragmentation, led the US disinflation to almost stall in late 2024. Also,
there was a scramble to buy various goods ahead of a potential rate increase as
a result of the Trump trade war tantrum. Now, in 2025, despite Trump’s
crackdown on immigrants (illegal/legal), core goods inflation is also again ticking
up in the US due to higher Trump tariffs and various policy tantrums, including
a massive crackdown on immigrants’ labour force, creating a labour supply
shortage and higher service inflation.
The convergence of Core PCE (2.9%) and Core CPI
(3.1%) inflation rates in July 2025 reflects a combination of methodological
alignment and economic factors. Rising healthcare costs, moderated shelter
inflation, and tariff-driven price pressures have narrowed the historical 0.5%
gap, as both indices capture similar inflationary trends. PCE’s chain-weighting
and broader coverage, combined with recent data revisions, have brought it
closer to CPI’s fixed-basket approach. This alignment signals persistent
inflation, influencing Fed policy and market expectations for cautious rate
adjustments. Investors and policymakers should monitor upcoming data, such as
the September 11, 2025, CPI release, to assess whether this trend continues.
The Fed is now preparing
the market for another rate cut in Q4CY25
At the present trend, the US core inflation may go
up to around 3.50% in 2026 from 3.00% in 2025 and then come down gradually to
around 2.0% on a sustainable basis by 2028. Thus, the Fed is now cautious about
stalled core disinflation and wants to reduce the restrictive rate in an
orderly manner or cautiously with a 50 bps cumulative cut each in 2025-27
rather than 100 bps in 2025-26. Fed already cut 100 bps in advance (front
loading) in H2CY24 to ensure no hard landing after some unusual uptick in
headline unemployment rate mid-2024. Fed may have gone for the panic cut of 50
bps in September ’24 and 25 bps each in November and December’24 in
anticipation of the Trump trade war and policy tantrum 2.0. Thus, the Fed may
have chosen to wait & watch in H1CY25 before going for any rate cuts in
H2CY25.
Overall, the 3MRA US core CPI (3.0%), PCE (2.9%),
and PPI (2.7%) inflation trend is showing a higher impact of PPI (input cost)
inflation and subsequent pass-on of the same to consumers. And both the US core
CPI and core PCE inflation are getting a boost now. The 3MRA (June-July-August)
2025 PCE and Core PCE inflation readings highlight a complex economic
environment. The Core PCEs increase to 2.9% YoY, coupled with a 2.7% headline
PCE rate, underscores persistent inflation above the Fed’s 2% target.
Conclusions:
Overall, the present level of average core
inflation should still be above 100 bps from the Fed’s target with an upward
risk, while the unemployment rate would be around 4.2% on average for 2025,
above 0.6% higher than the target of 3.7% with an upward bias. Fed has already
cut 25 bps each in September and may cut another 25 bps in December 2025,
followed by a long pause again in H1CY26 and then cut another 25 bps in
September’26, if average US core CPI inflation rises to around 3.50% in 2026
from 3.00% in 2025 due to Trump’s policies, even after assuming it as
transitory.
Then, if US core CPI inflation really comes down
towards 3.00% and 2.50-2.00% in 2027-2028 (assuming transitory Trumpflation),
the Fed may cut 50 bps in 2027 and 25 bps in 2028 for a longer run terminal
rate of 3.00% against pre-COVID levels of 2.50%. Fed may keep the longer run
neutral/real rate around 1.00% against 0.50% in pre-COVID times, assuming lower
US productivity and higher inflation dynamics. If US core CPI inflation does
not surge in 2026 towards a 3.50% average rate in H1CY26, then the Fed may cut
50 bps also in 2026, followed by another 50 bps in 2027 for a terminal rate of
3.00% by 2027.
Bottom
line:
·
Another 25 bps
Fed rate cut in December’25 is now almost certain, considering core inflation
and unemployment equations/outlooks.
·
Fed may not cut
rate at October 29 FOMC meeting as core disinflation almost stalled in H2CY26.
·
Fed may be on
hold till at least H2CY26 if US core inflation further surges towards 3.50%
from 3.0% average levels in 2025
Potential Impact on
Market of no Fed rate cut on October 29
The
market is now almost discounting a full 25 bps rate cut each in October and
December’25. But considering overall economic data & outlook (hotter than
expected core inflation around 3.0%, stable unemployment rate around 4.2% on
average, and hotter than expected real GDP growths) coupled with less dovish
stance by most of the FOMC participants, the Fed may not cut back-to-back and
pause in October. But the Fed may cut 25 bps in December.
Although
Trump’s Fed appointee Maran is quite vocal about more rate cuts and also voted
for a 50 bps cut in the September FOMC meeting, he is basically alone and not
an issue for the Fed at all. Trump’s public criticism of Chair Powell and the overall
Fed, along with insulting comments, may have united erstwhile known Fed doves
and hawks into owls (realists) and thus, even known Fed doves are now talking
like a hawk/owl; not in favor of back-to-back rate cuts in September followed
by October’25.
Wall
Street Futures are now hovering around a time high on AI/Tech optimism and
hopes of two more Fed rate cuts in October and December. But if the Fed does
not cut rates for the overall balance of economic data and a potential lack of
further data in October due to the government shutdown, Wall Street may correct
from record high valuation (SPX 500 TTM PE now over 30 bubble zone), and Gold
may also follow suit.
Weekly
Technical outlook: DJ-30, NQ-100, SPX-500 and Gold
Looking
ahead, whatever may be the narrative, technically Dow Future (CMP: 46700) now has to sustain over 47000 for a
further rally to 47300/47700*-48000/48300 AND 48600/49000-49700/50000 in the
coming days; otherwise sustaining below 46900/46500-46200/46000, dj-30 may fall
to 45800/45500-45300/44900 and further to 44200/43900-43400/42400 and
41700/41200-40700/39900 in the coming days.
Similarly,
NQ-100 Future (25000) now has
to sustain over 25300 and further rally to 25500/25700*-26000/26200 in the
coming days; otherwise, sustaining below 25200-25000, NQ-100 may fall to
24700/24500-24300/24000 and further 23700/23000-22600/22400 in the coming days.
Looking
ahead, whatever may be the fundamental narrative, technically SPX-500 (CMP: 6750) now has to sustain over 6800 for a
further rally to 6900*/7000-7500/8300 in the coming days; otherwise, sustaining
below 6775-6700, may fall to 6575/6550-6525/6500, may fall to
6450-6375/6300-6250/6200 and further fall to 6000/5800-5600/5300 in the coming
days.
Technically
Gold (CMP: 3875) has to sustain over 3905 for a further
rally to 3925*/3950-3975/4000 and 4025/4055-4075/4105 and 4125/4175-4265/4300
in the coming days; otherwise sustaining below 3785-3765/3700-3645/3635, Gold
may again fall to 3575/3545-3520/3500 and 3475/3435-3415/3380 and further
3350/3335-3305/3275-3225/3200 and 3175-3115 in the coming days.
Disclaimer: I
am an NSE-certified Level-2 market professional (Financial Analyst- Fundamental
+ Technical) and not a SEBI/SEC-registered investment advisor. The article is
purely educational and not a proxy for any trading/investment
signal/advice. I am a professional
analyst, signal provider, and content writer with over ten years of experience.
All views expressed in the blog are strictly personal and may not align with
any organization with, I may be associated.
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