Stocks surged on hopes of an imminent Ukraine war ceasefire
·
Nobel Peace Prize Aspirant Trump will meet Putin on
August 15 to start the negotiation process; Putin may have the last laugh for
the ROEU
·
Ukraine may have to surrender mineral-rich Eastern
Ukraine to Russia, which may also form a de facto JV with the US/Trump for REE
exploration & processing; China may join later
·
The US/EU/NATO/UN will not recognize ROEU (Russia-Occupied
Eastern Ukraine) officially, but practically, it will be a Russian territory
·
Now the key question is whether Ukraine will
approve the deal or Trump/NATO will force it to accept the same?
On late Friday, August 8, 2025, U.S. President Trump
announced officially that he is scheduled to meet Russian President Vladimir
Putin on August 15, 2025, in Alaska to discuss a potential ceasefire in the
ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. The summit, announced by Trump on Truth Social,
marks the first in-person meeting between the two leaders since Trump’s return
to the White House in January 2025 and Putin’s first U.S. visit in a decade.
The talks aim to address the conflict that began with Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine in February 2022, which has caused tens of thousands of deaths and
displaced millions.
Trump’s
potential meeting with Putin was in progress for the last few days and well
anticipated by the market and on
Friday, August 8, 2025, soon after the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty brokered
by Trump, he announced in his Truth: “The highly anticipated meeting between
myself, as President of the United States of America, and President Vladimir
Putin, of Russia, will take place next Friday, August 15, 2025, in the Great
State of Alaska. Further details to follow; Thank you for your attention to
this matter!
Trump has expressed optimism about nearing a
ceasefire, suggesting a deal might involve “swapping” territories, potentially
ceding parts of Ukraine’s eastern regions (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia,
Kherson) and Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014, to Moscow. However, Ukraine,
led by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has historically rejected territorial
concessions, and any such move would be politically challenging for Kyiv.
Alaska was chosen for its proximity to Russia (88
km across the Bering Strait) and because the U.S. is not a member of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued an arrest warrant for Putin
over alleged war crimes. This avoids legal complications for Putin’s travel.
Alaska’s historical ties to Russia, from its 1867 purchase, and its strategic
Arctic position also make it symbolically and logistically significant.
Negotiations
and Challenges: Recent reports
indicate Russia proposed a ceasefire that would solidify its control over
occupied Ukrainian territories, a plan criticized as a major concession for
Ukraine. Zelenskyy, absent from the Alaska summit, has pushed for a trilateral
meeting and emphasized that any territorial changes require a Ukrainian
referendum under the constitution. European allies are also excluded, raising
concerns about decisions being made without Kyiv’s direct input, reminiscent of
historical agreements like the 1945 Yalta Conference.
Trump’s
Strategy: Trump has oscillated
between praising Putin and expressing frustration over Russia’s continued
attacks, recently imposing a 50% tariff on Indian goods for buying Russian oil.
He set an August 8 deadline for Russia to agree to a ceasefire, threatening
secondary sanctions on countries trading with Moscow, though it’s unclear if
these will be enforced post-summit. Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, held
constructive talks with Putin in Moscow, signaling progress.
A deal heavily favoring Russia could embolden
further aggression, with some comparing it to a “Russian diplomatic victory.”
Ukraine’s exclusion from direct talks and the lack of European involvement
raise fears of an imposed solution. Experts suggest Trump should include
Ukraine and European allies post-summit and maintain military support to deter
Russia long-term. Trump’s push for peace through ultimatums and others are
skeptical of Russia’s intentions. The summit is seen as a high-stakes move,
with potential to either de-escalate the conflict or lock in Russian gains,
depending on the terms. The absence of Zelenskyy and European leaders
underscores tensions in the negotiation process, and Ukraine’s firm stance
against territorial losses suggests a challenging road ahead.
Putin’s
Calls with Modi and Xi coincide with Trump’s Truth for the Ukraine war summit:
U.S. President Donald Trump announced on August 8,
2025, via Truth Social that he will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in
Alaska on August 15, 2025, to discuss a potential ceasefire in the
Russia-Ukraine war. This announcement came shortly after Putin held phone calls
with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on
August 8, 2025, where he briefed them on his recent discussions with Trump’s
envoy, Steve Witkoff, regarding the Ukraine conflict.
Putin’s conversations with Modi and Xi were part of
a broader diplomatic outreach to key allies ahead of the Alaska summit. The
Kremlin confirmed Putin discussed his meeting with Witkoff, indicating these
calls were to update leaders of major Russian partners (both India and China
are significant buyers of Russian oil) on potential peace talks. Xi expressed
support for a “long-term solution” to the Ukraine conflict, while Modi
reaffirmed the India-Russia “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership” and
invited Putin to India later in 2025.
Trump’s announcement followed these calls, suggesting
a coordinated diplomatic push. He described the meeting as “highly anticipated”
and indicated progress toward a ceasefire, potentially involving territorial
swaps, though details remain vague. The timing aligns with Trump’s August 8
deadline for Russia to agree to a peace deal or face secondary sanctions on
countries like India and China for purchasing Russian oil.
Trump’s imposition of a 50% tariff on Indian goods
(25% already in effect from August 7) with an additional 25% starting August
27) for buying Russian oil; this has strained U.S.-India relations, adding
pressure on Modi’s stance. Similarly, Trump hinted at potential tariffs on
China, indicating a broader strategy to economically isolate Russia. The sequence of events—Putin’s calls with Modi and
Xi, followed by Trump’s summit announcement—indicates a complex diplomatic
maneuver. Trump’s approach seems to leverage economic pressure (tariffs) and
direct talks to push for a Ukraine ceasefire, while Putin is rallying support
from non-Western allies. However, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s
exclusion from the Alaska talks and his insistence that “any decision made
without Ukraine will never work” highlight potential friction.
Russia accelerates Ukraine special military
operation after Trump 2.0 in anticipation of a favorable ceasefire deal
including the grabbing of natural resource-rich (rare earth materials) Eastern
Ukraine, which was simply not possible under Biden. Russian forces have slowly
expanded the amount of territory they control over 2024, mostly in the east of
Ukraine, and have continued their recent barrage of air strikes on Kyiv and
other cities. In eastern Ukraine, Russia consolidated its hold significantly.
It has been trying to gain full control of the two
regions along with two more - Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Overall, Russia has
intensified its effort to control as much of Eastern Ukraine, bordering with
itself not only to make a security buffer zone between it and Ukraine for the
perceived threat of any NATO aggression through Ukraine in the future, but also
to control natural resources including substantial rare earth materials in
Eastern Ukraine.
Russia-Ukraine war, now in its fourth year since
the full-scale (‘Special Military Operation’) invasion began on February 24,
2022. Russian forces have gradually expanded their control, particularly in
eastern Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk regions, part of the Donbas, and have
recently intensified drone and missile attacks on cities like Kyiv and Kharkiv
ahead of a NATO summit in the Netherlands. Despite slow advances, such as a
40km push toward Pokrovsk over a year, the front line has remained largely
static for two years, with Russia relying on manpower, losing at least 45,000
troops in the past year, while Ukraine counters with innovative drone and
ground tactics.
In May 2024, Russia launched an incursion north of
Kharkiv, seizing villages during a period when U.S. weapon supplies were
stalled, though Ukrainian forces later held firm. Ukraine’s surprise August
2024 attack was into Russia’s Kursk region, capturing over 1,200 sq. km
initially, though Russia claims to have recaptured most by June 2025, with
Ukraine still holding 90 sq. km. This
has led to Zelensky suggesting a territory swap as part of peace talks, a
proposal complicated by Trump’s view that Ukraine may not reclaim pre-2014
borders.
Ceasefire negotiations, driven by the U.S. since
Trump’s inauguration, have been tense, marked by a February 2025 White House
epic clash (public drama) where Trump criticized Zelensky for delaying talks
and gambling with WW-III. A key development is the April 30, 2025, U.S.-Ukraine
deal to share profits from future mineral and energy reserves, aiming to fund
Ukraine’s defense and recovery, with the Donbas highlighted for its coal and
iron under Russian control. The war’s toll includes an estimated
165,000-235,000 Russian and 43,000 Ukrainian military deaths, though the latter
figure is likely underreported.
As of August 8, 2025, the control of natural
resources and rare earth materials in Ukraine by the United States and Russia
reflects a complex interplay of ongoing conflict and geopolitical strategy.
Russia currently occupies almost 20% of Ukrainian territory, including key
eastern regions like Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and parts of Kherson, as
well as Crimea, which it annexed in 2014. These areas are rich in critical
minerals, including rare earth elements (REEs) such as lithium, graphite,
titanium, and uranium, which are vital for technology, defense, and green
energy sectors.
U.S.-Russia’s
Ukraine Control: All about Natural Resources, including REE
Russia’s control extends over significant deposits,
notably in Donetsk and Luhansk, where about 40% of Ukraine’s metal resources,
including REEs, are located. The Shevchenko Field in Donetsk and Kruta Balka in
Zaporizhzhia hold substantial lithium reserves, estimated at 500,000 metric
tons, one of Europe’s largest untapped sources. Graphite reserves, comprising
20% of global resources, are also concentrated in these regions. By occupying
these resource-rich areas, Russia has disrupted Ukraine’s mining sector,
controlling an estimated $12.5 trillion in mineral wealth, including 56% of
Ukraine’s hard coal reserves and significant gas fields. This strengthens
Russia’s position in global supply chains, particularly as it seeks to maintain
energy dominance in Europe.
Recent proposals from Putin, ahead of the August 15
Alaska summit with Trump, suggest Russia might offer U.S. companies access to
these minerals as part of a ceasefire deal, aiming to weaken China’s monopoly
(70% of global REE production) and bolster economic ties with the U.S. But
eventually, both Russia and the U.S. will have to deliver most of these raw
REEs to China for final processing, at least for the next few years until the U.S.
and Russia develop their own REEs processing capabilities.
U.S.
Involvement: Mineral Deal
On May 1, 2025, the U.S. and Ukraine signed an
agreement granting the U.S. preferential access to Ukraine’s mineral resources,
including REEs, in exchange for continued support against Russia. This deal
establishes a joint U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund, funded by 50%
of royalties from state-owned resource projects, though it lacks specific security
guarantees for Ukraine. The focus is on untapped reserves in areas still under
Kyiv’s control, such as titanium in the northwest and lithium in the central
Kirovohrad region. The U.S. deal excludes resources in Russian-occupied zones,
limiting its scope. Trump’s initial demand for $500 billion in mineral rights
was scaled back, reflecting Ukraine’s resistance and the practical challenges
of accessing occupied territories.
The U.S. seeks to reduce its 70% reliance on
Chinese REE imports, driven by Trump’s push to secure domestic and allied
supplies. However, experts note that Ukraine’s REE deposits, while promising,
are largely unminable due to war damage, outdated infrastructure, and lack of
commercial operations, with extraction potentially taking 15 years or more.
Thus, both the U.S. and Russia have to take the help of Chinese expertise to
produce & process these untapped REEs, which explains the recent ‘romance’
between the U.S. (Trump 2.0) and China. Trump is now planning to form a virtual
JV with China and Russia to secure REEs. The U.S. may have to allow/deliver
these REEs to China to process for secure access to the same.
The Ukraine war has halted mining in occupied
areas, with Russia’s advances disrupting supply chains. Ukraine closed its last
coking coal mine near Pokrovsk in January 2025 as Russian forces closed in. Geologists
and analysts question the viability of Ukraine’s REE reserves, citing outdated
Soviet-era data and the dominance of unprocessable minerals like britholite.
Some see the U.S. deal as political theater rather than a feasible economic
strategy. The Alaska summit’s focus on a ceasefire involving territorial swaps
could shift resource control further toward Russia, complicating U.S. plans.
Ukraine’s insistence on a referendum for any territorial concessions adds
uncertainty.
Beyond Russia's stated security concerns and
opposition to NATO expansion in Ukraine, the control of rare earth materials
and natural resources could be a significant, though less publicized, factor in
the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Ukraine is estimated to hold $12.5 trillion in mineral
wealth, including rare earth elements (REEs) like lithium, graphite, titanium,
and uranium, critical for technology, defense, and green energy. Russia’s occupied
regions, such as Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimea, contain
about 40% of Ukraine’s metal resources, including Europe’s largest lithium
deposits (500,000 metric tons) and significant graphite reserves (20% of global
supply). Russia’s control over these areas since 2014 and its 2022 invasion
could be aimed at securing this economic/REE leverage.
Russia, alongside China (which controls ~70% of
global REE production and ~90% processing), may seek to counter Western
dependence on Chinese minerals. By occupying Ukraine’s resource-rich
territories, Russia could disrupt supply chains, force international companies
to negotiate with Moscow, or even offer access to the U.S. as part of a
ceasefire deal, as hinted in recent summit talks. This aligns with Russia’s
strategy to maintain energy and mineral dominance, especially as European reliance
on Russian gas wanes.
The U.S. deal with Ukraine on May 1, 2025, granting
preferential access to its REEs in exchange for support, may have intensified
Russia’s resolve. This agreement, targeting untapped reserves in
Kyiv-controlled areas, threatens Russia’s regional economic influence. Securing
Ukraine’s resources could prevent the U.S. and its allies from reducing their
70% reliance on Chinese imports, giving Russia a bargaining chip in global
trade negotiations. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, which holds
substantial gas fields and titanium deposits, suggests a pattern of
resource-driven aggression. The escalation into eastern Ukraine, rich in coal
and REEs, supports the theory that economic gain complements the perceived security
narratives.
While Russia frames the never-ending Ukraine war as
a response to NATO’s eastward push, the timing of intensified resource
exploitation in occupied zones, such as coal mining near Pokrovsk until its
closure in January 2025. However, the ongoing war damaged and outdated
infrastructure limits immediate REE extraction, suggesting long-term control
might be the goal rather than short-term.
Russia’s actions are less about NATO and more about
controlling Ukraine’s mineral treasure; Russia always maintains that Eastern
Ukraine was a part & parcel of the former USSR led by Russia. Ukraine inherited
some nuclear arsenal of the USSR/Russia during disintegration, which it finally
handed over to Russia under the US mediation in exchange for a security
guarantee from NATO.
Ukraine-Russia
geopolitics
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,
Ukraine inherited the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, comprising
approximately 1,900 strategic warheads, 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), and 44 strategic bombers, along with an estimated 2,800 to 4,200
tactical nuclear warheads. This arsenal, originally stationed on Ukrainian soil
by the Soviet Union to target the West, posed a complex challenge for the newly
independent state. Ukraine lacked operational control over these weapons, as
Russia retained the launch codes and control systems, and maintaining them was
financially and technically unfeasible, especially given the economic turmoil
following the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.
In the early 1990s, Ukraine committed to a
non-nuclear status, as outlined in its 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty,
which pledged not to accept, produce, or acquire nuclear weapons. International
pressure, particularly from the United States, and the need for economic
support pushed Ukraine toward denuclearization. Negotiations began with the
1992 Lisbon Protocol, where Ukraine, along with Belarus and Kazakhstan, agreed
to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and return
nuclear weapons to Russia, a process facilitated under the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START I).
The critical turning point came with the Trilateral
Statement, signed on January 14, 1994, in Moscow by U.S. President Bill
Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and Ukrainian President Leonid
Kravchuk. This agreement committed Ukraine to transfer all nuclear warheads to
Russia for elimination in exchange for security assurances, economic
compensation for the highly enriched uranium (valued for nuclear reactor fuel),
and U.S. assistance via the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to
dismantle missiles, silos, and infrastructure.
The process culminated in the Budapest Memorandum
on Security Assurances, signed on December 5, 1994, by the U.S., Russia, and
the U.K., with France and China later providing similar assurances. Under this
memorandum, the signatories pledged to respect Ukraine’s independence,
sovereignty, and existing borders, refrain from the threat or use of force, and
provide assistance if Ukraine faced aggression involving nuclear weapons—though
the term "assurances" was used instead of "guarantees,"
lacking a binding enforcement mechanism.
Ukraine fulfilled its obligations, transferring the
last nuclear warheads to Russia by June 1, 1996, and eliminating its final
strategic delivery vehicle in 2001. However, the security assurances proved
hollow when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and launched a full-scale invasion in
2022, actions widely seen as violations of the memorandum. This has led to debates
in Ukraine about whether retaining nuclear weapons might have deterred Russian
aggression, though experts note the practical and diplomatic costs—such as
international isolation and resource demands—would have been significant. The
U.S. mediation, while successful in achieving denuclearization, is now
criticized for offering assurances without enforceable commitments, leaving
Ukraine vulnerable in the face of Russia’s actions.
Why did Russia/Putin
target Ukraine from 2014?
Fast forward, Russia’s military aggression against
Ukraine, marked by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion
beginning February 24, 2022, stems from a combination of strategic, political,
and economic factors, as articulated by President Vladimir Putin and analyzed by
geopolitical experts.
Security
Concerns and NATO Membership & Expansion: Putin has consistently cited the eastward expansion of NATO as an
existential threat to Russia, arguing that Ukraine’s potential NATO membership
would bring military infrastructure close to Russia’s borders. The 2008 NATO
summit decision to consider Ukraine and Georgia for membership, coupled with
Ukraine’s growing alignment with the West after the 2014 Euromaidan uprising,
heightened these fears. Russia views potential NATO’s presence around it as a
direct challenge to its sphere of influence.
Preserving
Regional Influence: Ukraine’s pivot
toward the European Union (EU) and away from Russia’s orbit; accelerated by the
2014 ousting of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, threatened Russia’s
historical dominance in the post-Soviet space; Controlling Ukraine, a buffer
state with deep cultural and economic ties to Russia, is seen as essential to
maintaining Moscow’s geopolitical clout. Russia always wants to maintain a
pro-Russian government (political leader) in Ukraine, and now Trump 2.0 is also
stressing that indirectly, asking Zelenskyy to go for the general election
immediately in the aftermath of the full destruction of the country.
Nationalist
and Historical Narrative: Putin has
repeatedly framed Ukraine as an inseparable part of Russia, echoing Soviet and
imperial histories. In his 2021 essay "On the Historical Unity of Russians
and Ukrainians" and pre-invasion speeches, he denied Ukraine’s legitimacy
as a sovereign nation, claiming it as part of a greater Russian civilization.
The aggression is partly driven by a desire to reclaim this perceived lost
territory. Putin, a former KGB head, basically questioned the wisdom of his
predecessors like Gorbachev and Yeltsin to sell the country (USSR) to the
US/NATO.
Control of
Natural Resources: Ukraine’s vast
natural resource wealth, including rare earth elements (REEs) like lithium and
graphite (estimated at $12.5 trillion), offers economic incentives. Russia’s
occupation of resource-rich regions like Donbas and Crimea since 2014 suggests
a strategy to secure these assets, potentially as leverage in global trade or
to counter Western reliance on Chinese minerals.
Domestic
Political Compulsion: The Ukraine conflict
(war) bolsters Putin’s image as a strong leader amid domestic challenges, such
as economic stagnation and declining approval ratings. Rallying nationalist
sentiment around the "protection" of Russian-speaking populations in
eastern Ukraine and Crimea helps consolidate his power. Russia’s nominal GDP
grew from ~$0.3T in 2000 to $2.29T in 2013 (before Ukraine conflict started),
but declined from 2014 (Crimea invasion) and now stands around $2.17T in 2024,
while CPI index soared by almost 625% between 2000 and 2024; currency (RUB)
slide against USD from ~24 in 2000 to an all-time low ~114 in May’24 and now
~80; thus Trump termed Russia a ‘dead economy’ along with India. Putin’s
Ukraine war is aiming at boosting nationalist image despite ‘unjustified’
American/Western sanctions. The Russian defense industry is also facing intense
competition from ‘all-weather friend’ China.
Despite these motives, Western analysts and
Ukrainian officials argue that Russia’s actions are preemptive and aggressive,
not defensive, given that Ukraine posed no imminent military threat. The
failure of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum’s security assurances, which Ukraine
relied on after denuclearizing, has been cited as a pretext, though Putin’s
rejection of Ukraine’s sovereignty remains the core driver. Recent X posts
reflect a mix of views, with some attributing the aggression to NATO
provocation and others to Putin’s imperial ambitions, though evidence supports
a multifaceted strategy rather than a single cause.
Increasing
NATO expansion around Russia and Eastern Europe is a security threat to Putin:
Russia, spanning Eastern Europe and North Asia,
shares land borders with 14 countries, several of which are NATO members or
influenced by its expansion, and also known US allies. The following overview
outlines Russia's map and the surrounding NATO-influenced countries, reflecting
the geopolitical context shaped by NATO's growth since 1949.
Russia’s
Borders and NATO/EU Presence:
·
Northern and Northwestern Borders: Russia borders Norway (NATO member since 1949) and
Finland (joined NATO in April 2023). Finland’s accession, prompted by Russia’s
2022 invasion of Ukraine, more than doubled Russia’s NATO border to
approximately 1,584 miles, particularly affecting the Arctic and Baltic Sea
regions. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (all NATO members since 2004, former
Soviet states) also share borders, bringing NATO’s presence to Russia’s
northwest, with Estonia just 150 km from St. Petersburg.
·
Western Border: Poland (NATO since 1999) and Lithuania form part of Russia’s western
frontier, with the Kaliningrad exclave (a Russian territory) sandwiched between
them, hosting Russian military assets close to NATO lines. Belarus, a Russian ally, borders Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia,
amplifying Russia’s military reach toward NATO.
·
Southwestern Border: No direct NATO members border Russia here, but
Ukraine, a non-NATO country heavily influenced by Western support since 2014,
lies adjacent. Romania and Slovakia (both NATO since 2004 and 2004,
respectively) are nearby, influencing the Black Sea region.
·
Southern Borders: Georgia and Azerbaijan, not NATO members, border Russia’s Caucasus
region. Georgia has aspired to join NATO since 2008, especially after Russia’s
2008 conflict there, while Azerbaijan maintains a neutral stance amid Russian
and Western influence; but Trump is now a good friend of Azerbaijan and also
Armenia after ending the 35-year-long bloody war between the two nations in
Central Asia.
·
Eastern Borders: China, Mongolia, and North Korea border Russia’s vast Asian expanse,
none of which is NATO-influenced, and also China’s growing partnership with
Russia counters Western pressure.
NATO
Expansion and Influenced Countries:
·
Historical Growth: NATO began with 12 members in 1949, expanding
eastward post-Cold War. The 1999 wave included Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic, followed by the 2004 wave, adding Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—many former Soviet or Warsaw Pact
states. Later additions include Albania and Croatia (2009), Montenegro (2017),
North Macedonia (2020), and Sweden (2024), driven by Russia’s actions in
Ukraine.
·
Influenced Non-Members: Ukraine and Georgia are key NATO aspirants, with
Ukraine’s alignment intensifying since 2014 and Sweden’s recent membership
reflecting a shift triggered by Russia’s aggression. Moldova, though neutral,
faces growing Western influence, potentially aligning with NATO amid regional
tensions.
·
Russian Perspective: Putin has long viewed NATO’s eastward shift as
encirclement, citing the 1990s verbal US promise (disputed) not to expand
eastward. The addition of Finland and Sweden, plus Ukraine’s NATO aspirations,
is seen as a direct threat, fueling the narrative behind the 2014 Crimea
annexation and 2022 invasion.
Putin’s
perceived NATO phobia: The world needs another security alliance like BRICS
NATO’s reach now encircles much of Russia’s western
and northern borders, with countries like Ukraine and Georgia acting as
buffers. This NATO expansion has escalated tensions. The strategic placement of
NATO troops and bases, especially near the Baltic States and Finland, underscores
a heightened standoff, with Russia countering by bolstering its military
presence, including nuclear capabilities in Kaliningrad. This dynamic reflects
a complex interplay of security concerns, historical rivalries, and resource
interests, with NATO’s expansion reshaping the geopolitical landscape around
Russia. Putin himself offered Obama (jokingly or seriously) that Russia should
also be included in NATO at some point in time, considering NATO’s continued
Eastward expansion.
Putin’s public stance, especially after 2007’s
Munich Security Conference speech, has been one of opposition to NATO
expansion, viewing it as a threat to Russian security. The 2021 Russian
ultimatum to NATO, demanding a halt to eastward expansion, further contradicts
the idea of a serious offer to join. While Russia participated in NATO’s
Partnership for Peace program in 1994, and the NATO-Russia Council was
established in 2002 to foster dialogue, these were cooperative frameworks.
The world needs another NATO alternative security pact
in the form of BRICS; adhering NATO principle of not launching any war with
each other and any attack on any member would be seen as an attack on the whole
group. BRICS-like security pack involving Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa along with other interested countries, would have resulted in no NATO
phobia in the mind of Putin and ensured good relations with neighbouring
states, most of which were part & parcel of the USSR.
What’s next
for the Ukraine war?
Ahead of a potential Ukraine air warfare ceasefire,
drone warfare intensified by both Russia and Ukraine; overall, Ukraine is now on
the back foot. Russian President Putin has reportedly informed the Trump administration
that he would agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine in exchange for Kyiv ceding
Eastern Ukraine to Moscow. According to the WSJ report, Putin submitted his
proposal, which requires global recognition of Russia's control over the
eastern part of Ukraine, during his meeting with US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff
on Wednesday, August 6, 2025. Putin is said to have asked that Ukraine withdraw
forces from the whole Donetsk region and hand over Donetsk, Lugansk and Crimea
to Russia. But European officials expressed "serious reservations"
about Russia's plan.
Ukrainian President Zelensky stated on Sunday,
August 10, 2025, that the resolution of
the war with Russia "must be fair" following the announcement of a
meeting between U.S. President Trump and Russian President Putin scheduled for
next week. Zelensky emphasized that it is unclear whether Ukrainian officials
will attend, though reports suggest the U.S. is considering inviting him. He
expressed gratitude for support from European allies, who insist any peace plan
must include a ceasefire, protect Ukraine’s and Europe’s security interests
with "robust and credible" guarantees for Kyiv, and uphold Ukraine’s
"freedom of choice over its destiny." While welcoming Trump’s
efforts, Zelensky stressed the necessity of Kyiv’s inclusion in negotiations. According
to the WSJ report, European diplomats insisted that Ukraine and its European
allies must be included in peace negotiations and that the European Union could
host future talks. In addition, the Italian government allegedly believes the
EU must continue supporting the Trump administration's efforts to achieve
peace.
Meanwhile, the US Vice President Vance announced on
Sunday, August 10, 2025, that the U.S. is actively working to arrange a meeting
between Ukrainian President Zelensky and Russian President Putin. However,
Vance indicated that scheduling this meeting before Putin’s planned August 15
summit with U.S. President Trump in Alaska would not be productive. Vance said
he spoke to the Ukrainian government earlier Sunday but that Trump will have to
"force President Putin and President Zelensky to sit down, to figure out
their differences."
Vance also declined to comment on his ambitions for
the 2028 presidential election and rumors that he might choose Secretary of
State Marco Rubio as his running mate. "If we do a good job, the politics
will take care of itself," Vance said, adding that it is "too early
to think" that far ahead.
Conclusions
On August 15, 2025, Putin may officially submit his
written proposal for the Ukraine war permanent ceasefire (end) plan,
emphasizing his wish list of taking control of Eastern Ukraine, including
Crimea; no NATO membership of Ukraine; no further NATO expansion in Eastern
Europe and a security guarantee for Russia from NATO/US. Putin and Trump may
also announce at least a temporary (30 days) Ukraine war ceasefire or only air
warfare ceasefire (as both Russia and Ukraine/US need time to manufacture
drones, missiles etc, while China is the main supplier of basic raw
materials-REEs for both sides to produce such weapons). Trump will then
officially hand over Putin’s Ukraine proposal to Zelenskyy and also talk with
him and his European/NATO counterparts. The back-and-forth Ukraine ceasefire
talks and final deal should be completed by September, so that Noble Peace
Prize Aspirant Trump may get the same on October 10, 2025.
Putin may
have the last laugh in the Ukraine war
Russian asset or sympathizer, Trump may propose
swapping of lands, war prisoners, etc and ensure 50:50 JV with Russia to
explore/produce/process REEs in Eastern Ukraine, which Putin seeks to control
entirely. The US will provide security assurance to both Russia and Ukraine;
Crimea may officially become Russian territory along with part of East Ukraine
(Donetsk).
The US and
NATO leaders are preparing the world for Putin’s de facto win and the grabbing
of Eastern Ukraine:
As per
influential US Senator and a close Trump ally, Lindsay Graham, Trump may ensure a permanent ceasefire deal
between Russia and Ukraine that would likely involve territorial swaps,
aligning with Trump’s comments about land exchanges. He stated, "Ukraine
is not going to evict every Russian, and Russia is not going to Kyiv, so there
will be some land swaps at the end." However, he emphasized that any deal
must include robust security guarantees to prevent future Russian aggression,
proposing European forces as "tripwires" and continued U.S. military
support. Graham also expressed support for Trump’s planned August 15 Alaska
summit with Putin, hoping Zelenskyy could be involved, marking a complete shift
from his 2023 stance against conceding territory to aggressors.
Graham advocated Trump’s stance to ensure
territorial control of Eastern Ukraine including Crimea with Russia with a mineral
deal for the US, proving a face-saving exit for Putin with a stern warning
about any 3rd attempt on Ukraine or any similar attempt to any other
neighbouring country. The US will treat Eastern Ukraine as Equivalent to
China’s Taiwan and ensure full security for Ukraine even without NATO
membership; Ukraine may be taken as a member state by the EU in the future.
The NATO
Secretary General Mark Rutte has made several notable comments regarding the
Ukraine war ceasefire. On August 10, Rutte described the upcoming August 15 Alaska summit between U.S. President Trump
and Russian President Putin as a critical test of Putin’s seriousness in ending
the war; it’s just the start of the bigger negotiation process. He stated,
"He [Putin] is still the main threat to the Western alliance," and
praised Trump for breaking the diplomatic deadlock in February 2025 by
initiating dialogue with Putin. Rutte emphasized that while the Friday meeting
would focus on testing Putin’s intent, it would not finalize any deal, and
Ukraine must be involved in subsequent peace talks concerning territories and
security guarantees. He noted, "Ukraine will have to be, and will be,
involved," addressing concerns about Kyiv’s exclusion, and affirmed NATO’s
coordination of lethal weapons delivery to Ukraine to ensure it remains strong
for negotiations.
Rutte reiterated the summit’s purpose as testing
Putin’s commitment to peace, saying, "Next Friday will be important
because it will be about testing Putin, how serious he is on bringing this
terrible war to an end." He expressed confidence in Trump’s intent to end
the loss of life and damage in Ukraine, acknowledging Russia’s factual control
of some Ukrainian territory as a negotiation point, though not legally
recognizing it. Rutte stressed Ukraine’s sovereign right to decide its future,
rejecting any Russian say in its geopolitical status or NATO’s eastern flank
presence. He dismissed fears of rewarding Russia, citing Trump’s pressure
tactics like tariffs on India and increased weapon supplies as evidence of a
balanced approach.
Rutte also acknowledged that Ukraine has to give
Eastern Ukraine to Russia for the permanent ceasefire/peace deal in return for
full NATO assurance, security, sovereignty and peace. The NATO/EU/US will
recognize swapped/surrendered Eastern Ukraine to Russia as ‘[De-facto’ or
‘occupied Eastern Ukraine’ by Russia just like ‘Occupied Kashmir’ or POK (Pakistan
occupied Kashmir) or Akshay Chin (China occupied Kashmir/Ladakh region) to
India or Taiwan to China. Theoretically, Ukraine, the EU, the US, NATO and even
the UN will not recognize Russia-occupied Eastern Ukraine and continue to show
Eastern Ukraine as a part of Ukraine in their official map, but practically it
will be a permanent Russian territory.
Market Wrap
Wall Street surged mid-Friday, August 8, 2025, on
hopes of an imminent Ukraine war ceasefire after Trump indicated her would meet
Putin in the coming days and some ‘swapping of land’ would happen for a
permanent Ukraine war ceasefire. The S&P 500 rose 0.8%, the Nasdaq-100 surged
almost 1% to mark a record closing high for the second straight day, and the
Dow (DJ-30) gained 206 points. Techs led the rally, led by Apple following its
announcement of a $600 billion US investment plan, boosting the tech-heavy
Nasdaq on hopes of favorable Trump policy. Tesla gained despite disbanding its
Dojo team, and Intel rose after its CEO reaffirmed board support despite
Trump’s calls for his resignation. For the week, the S&P 500 climbed 2.4%,
the Dow rose 1.4%, and the Nasdaq surged 3.9% on hopes of less hawkish Trump
tariffs and Fed monetary policy, coupled with hopes of an imminent Ukraine war
ceasefire.
On the weekend, the US Treasury Secretary Bessent
said the U.S. aims to wrap up trade negotiations with remaining countries by
late October, and in the longer term (after 2029; Trump 2.0), US tariff rate
may be lowered in the trade deficit will also get lower.
Techs may
retreat as there was an FT report on the weekend, indicating Nvidia and AMD have agreed to share 15%
of revenues from certain chip sales in China with the U.S. government, in
exchange for export licenses for Nvidia’s H20 and AMD’s MI308 chips. Nvidia CEO
Jensen Huang met with Trump last week. In a statement, Nvidia noted: “We follow
the rules the U.S. government sets for our participation in worldwide markets.”
Weekly
Technical outlook: DJ-30, NQ-100, SPX-500 and Gold
Looking
ahead, whatever may be the narrative, technically Dow Future (CMP: 44800) now has to sustain over 45000 for a
further rally towards 45300*/45800* and only sustaining above 45800, may
further rally to 46100/46500-47100/47200 in the coming days; otherwise
sustaining below 44950, DJ-30 may again fall to 44200/43900-43400/42400 and
41700/41200-40700/39900 in the coming days.
Similarly,
NQ-100 Future (23800) now has
to sustain over 24200 for a further rally to 24300/24450-24700/25000 in the
coming days; otherwise, sustaining below 24150/24000-23750/22900, NQ-100 may
again fall to 22400/22200-21900/20900-20700/20200 and 19890/18300-17400/16400in
the coming days.
Looking
ahead, whatever may be the fundamental narrative, technically SPX-500 (CMP: 6400) now has to sustain over 6600 for a
further rally to 6800/7000-7500/8300 in the coming days; otherwise, sustaining
below 6550/6500-6450-6375/6300-6250/6200, SPX-500may again fall to
6000/5800-5600/5300 in the coming days.
Technically
Gold (CMP: 3400) has to sustain over 3405-3425 for a
further rally to 3450/3475-3495/3505*, and even 3525/3555 in the coming days;
otherwise sustaining below 3400-3360, Gold may again fall to
3340/3320-3300*/3280 and 3255*/3225*-3200/3165* and further to
3130/3115*-3075/3015-2990/2975-2960*/2900* and 2800/2750 in the coming days.
Disclaimer: I
am an NSE-certified Level-2 market professional (Financial Analyst- Fundamental
+ Technical) and not a SEBI/SEC-registered investment advisor. The article is
purely educational and not a proxy for any trading/investment
signal/advice. I am a professional
analyst, signal provider, and content writer with over ten years of experience.
All views expressed in the blog are strictly personal and may not align with
any organization with, I may be associated.
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