Nifty, INR slips on escalated Trump’s India tariff tantrum
·
Trump is trying to publicly pressure India &
privately China to force Putin to stop the Ukraine war by August 8-12; will
Putin oblige?
·
Trump’s bullying tactics and insulting comments about
India may compel the Modi admin to go slower on BTA talks due to domestic
political compulsion.
·
Trump 2.0 no longer needs India to counter China,
as Trump is now not seeking decoupling, but derisking with China on various
strategic issues.
·
India needs the US and USD; the US is India’s
biggest source of USD (trade surplus + remittances) for ~$95B
·
The US alone constitutes almost 15% of India’s FX/USD
reserve; USDINR may soar to 95-100 if Trump's tariff tantrum lingers and
intensifies seriously.
·
Trump may impose 100-500% tariffs; An effective
embargo on Indian products as a part of Russian secondary sanctions.
·
This is a wakeup call for India to reset and
reform further to be economically competitive globally and reduce the US
dependency
President Trump announced a 25% tariff on all
Indian goods effective August 1, 2025, citing India's high tariffs on U.S.
goods, which he described as "among the highest in the world," and
its "strenuous and obnoxious" non-monetary trade barriers. He also
criticized India's significant purchases of Russian oil and military equipment,
arguing these enable Russia's war in Ukraine. Additionally, an unspecified
"penalty" (secondary sanctions) was mentioned for India's energy and
arms purchases from Russia.
On late
Friday, August 1, 2025, Trump said when asked about India- if he had a number in mind for the penalties and
if he is going to speak with PM Modi: "I understand that India is no
longer going to be buying oil from Russia. That's what I heard, I don't know if
that's right or not. That is a good step. We will see what happens”.
As usual, Trump may have tried to trap India with
his forward-looking statement about India, already slowing down oil purchases
from Russia. In any way, Trump’s preemptive comments cause a huge uproar in the
Indian media and political circle, trying to portray PM Modi as a weak leader,
bending down instantly to Trump’s tariff gun. Subsequently, Indian officials categorically
denied such a move on the part of India to begin slowing down Russian oil
purchase soon after Trump’s penalty tariff threat on India (August 31, 2025),
which was also widely reported by US media over the weekend as a response from
‘strong India” against Trump’s bullying tactics.
Subsequently, on Monday, August 4, 2025, Trump
escalated his rhetoric, stating he would "substantially" raise
tariffs on India for buying and reselling Russian oil on the global market for
big profits, accusing India of indifference to the Ukraine conflict. He claimed
India was profiting from Russian oil while ignoring the human cost of Russia's
actions.
Trump
wrote in his Truth: “India is not
only buying massive amounts of Russian Oil, they are then, for much of the Oil
purchased, selling it on the Open Market for big profits. They don’t care how
many people in Ukraine are being killed by the Russian War Machine. Because of
this, I will be substantially raising the Tariff paid by India to the USA.
Thank you for your attention to this matter!!! President DJT”
In
response to Trump’s Truth, India also made a statement by the Official
Spokesperson of the MEA on August
04, 2025, calling Trump’s targeting "unjustified and unreasonable,"
noting that the U.S. previously encouraged India to buy Russian oil at a price
cap to keep global prices in check. The MEA also highlighted that the EU’s
trade with Russia in 2024 exceeded India’s, suggesting a double standard in
criticism.
·
India has been
targeted by the United States and the European Union for importing oil from
Russia after the commencement of the Ukraine conflict. India began importing
from Russia because traditional supplies were diverted to Europe after the
outbreak of the conflict. The United States at that time actively encouraged
such imports from India for strengthening global energy markets.
·
India’s imports
are meant to ensure predictable and affordable energy costs to the Indian
consumer. They are a necessity compelled by the global market situation.
However, it is revealing that the very nations criticizing India are themselves
indulging in trade with Russia. Unlike our case, such trade is not even a vital
national compulsion.
·
The European
Union in 2024 had a bilateral trade of Euro 67.5 billion in goods with Russia.
In addition, it had trade in services estimated at Euro 17.2 billion in 2023.
This is significantly more than India’s total trade with Russia that year or
subsequently. European imports of LNG in 2024 reached a record 16.5mn tonnes,
surpassing the last record of 15.21mn tonnes in 2022.
·
Europe-Russia
trade includes not just energy, but also fertilizers, mining products,
chemicals, iron and steel, and machinery and transport equipment.
·
Where the
United States is concerned, it continues to import from Russia uranium
hexafluoride for its nuclear industry, palladium for its EV industry,
fertilizers, as well as chemicals.
·
In this
background, the targeting of India is unjustified and unreasonable. Like any
major economy, India will take all necessary measures to safeguard its national
interests and economic security.
The U.S. had a $45.8 billion goods trade deficit
with India in 2024, which Trump aims to address. He has expressed frustration
with the lack of progress in trade deal negotiations, particularly over India's
reluctance to open its agriculture and dairy sectors to U.S. exports. Despite
ongoing talks for a bilateral trade agreement (BTA), no deal was finalized by
the August 1 deadline. Indian officials have indicated that tariffs may be
temporary as negotiations continue, but Trump’s stance suggests a hardline
approach, with no willingness to accept partial concessions.
Indian officials have maintained that they will
continue purchasing Russian oil, driven by long-term contracts and economic
benefits from discounted prices. Russia supplies about 35% of India’s oil
imports, making it the largest supplier. India argues that these imports
stabilize global oil prices and are necessary for its energy security, given
its almost 1.5 billion population.
India’s Commerce Ministry and officials, including
Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal, emphasized that the government will take all
necessary steps to protect national interests, particularly for farmers,
entrepreneurs, and small businesses. India remains committed to a "fair,
balanced, and mutually beneficial" trade agreement with the U.S.
The US/EU
double standard on Russian sanctions and oil & gas:
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, India has
increased its Russian oil imports from less than 1% to over one-third of its
total oil imports (approximately 1.75 million barrels per day in 2025). This
shift was driven by discounted prices due to Western sanctions, helping India
manage global oil price surges. Reports
of a pause in Russian oil purchases by Indian state refineries in July 2025
were attributed to narrowing discounts and seasonal factors (monsoon and
refinery maintenance), not a policy shift. Indian officials clarified that no
directive was issued to state-run refineries to halt Russian oil imports, and
long-term contracts make an abrupt cessation impractical.
On August 1, 2025, Trump claimed he
"heard" India was halting Russian oil imports, calling it a
"good step" if true. However, India’s MEA denied any such policy
change, stating energy decisions are based on market prices and global
conditions.
The EU needs cheaper Russian energy products
desperately for its industry and households, especially Germany. The EU is also
dependent on various Russian commodities, including certain food articles. In
brief, the EU is the biggest loser of the Ukraine war, subsequent geopolitical
fragmentations and sanctions on Russia. And overall NATO/EU/US/Biden policy for
encircling Russia with NATO/allied countries like Ukraine and the attraction to
control Ukraine’s vast reserve of rare earth materials is also responsible for
the Ukraine war; it's not only Putin’s ‘expansionist’ policies; two sides may
be responsible.
Although
as a sovereign country, India does not need to explain every time Trump throws an insulting comment, the reality is
that India needs the US and the USD; otherwise. The US is now India’s biggest
source of USD ~$95B to $100B if we combine both export surplus and net inward
remittances. The US, under Trump 2.0,
now no longer needs India against China. Trump 2.0 now abandons the China
decoupling policy, unlike during Trump 1.0, and is now focusing more on
de-risking, treating China as the main competitor rather than adversary.
China is now overtaking the US not only in terms
of real wealth, development, prosperity, but also in hi-techs, AI, chips,
quantum computing, 6G, and advanced military hardware & software. China’s
indigenous GPRS and operating system have reduced it on the US. The US now sees
China as an equal, if not bigger competitor in both economic and military,
i.e., as the true number two superpower in the world in all aspects; not as a
mere military superpower like the old USSR (now Russia). Thus, Trump 2.0 is now
negotiating with a stronger China with a different approach (3D chess game)
than India, which has no leverage (cards) like China.
The US and China now have almost 45% of global
GDP; both are dependent on each other for prosperity and growth. China is also
the biggest export market for the US, and thus Trump 2.0 is now no longer
seeking China decoupling, but derisking. For Trump, China, its market and supply
chain are far bigger and important than ‘tiny’ India, and thus Trump 2.0 is now
less hawkish on China and harsher on India.
Trump may not sign any BTA with India, unless it
opens the economy almost fully like Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, and
other ASEAN countries with 0% tariff and no stringent (obnoxious) regulations.
As a ‘vibrant democracy’, India or any main political party may not be ready
yet to sacrifice both the note bank and vote bank for US interests. Trump may
not like India’s go-slow time time-consuming negotiation tactics and may also
favor Pakistan more than India because of its high potential rare earth
materials reserve for ~$6T, something which India does not have at present.
On April 10, 2025, Trump announced a 90-day pause
on these tariffs for most non-retaliating countries, including India, to allow
further trade negotiations, providing temporary relief for Indian exporters up
to July 312, 2025. On July 30, 2025, Trump announced a 25% tariff on Indian
goods effective August 1, 2025, with an additional unspecified “penalty” (secondary
sanctions) for India’s purchases of Russian oil and military equipment. The
White House later clarified that the tariff would apply from August 7, 2025,
affecting 69 countries, including India. The short extension window of 7 days
has been given to the US Customs Department to prepare itself to impose and
collect the tariffs (from US importers). Trump expressed frustration over the
lack of progress in U.S.-India trade talks, viewing the tariff as a “remedy” to
push for a deal.
Trump’s India tariff was tied to geopolitical
concerns, particularly India’s trade with Russia amid the Ukraine conflict, but
also exposed a double standard on the part of Trump/US policy. Trump always
blames his predecessor, Biden, for the Ukraine war. The Biden admin and even
Trump in his first few months under 2nd term did not raise any
serious objections about India’s oil trade with Russia. Trump’s so-called
penalty threat was linked to India’s significant imports of Russian energy and
arms, with Trump criticizing India for supporting Russia’s economy during the
Ukraine war. U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham also proposed tariffs up to 500% on
countries buying Russian oil, including India.
The EU was happy as the Russian sanctions by the
G7/West/US/NATO were designed in such a way that Indian and Chinese refiners
could buy Russian ‘dirty’ oil at a big discount and were able to sell to the EU
at a huge profit after refining the same into ‘clean’ fuel (gasoline). The EU
didn’t buy Russian ‘dirty’ oil with ‘Ukraine blood' directly, but did the same
indirectly through India and China to meet its demand. The ground reality is
that the EU was dependent on Russian energy (oil & gas). But now, after the
US-EU trade deal, Trump is trying to sell US oil & gas to the EU instead of
Russia, either directly or indirectly. Thus, Trump is now pressuring India to
abandon Russian oil and buy US. The EU is also now behaving like a hypocrite
and threatening India and China with secondary sanctions for buying Russian
oil.
In brief, Trump’s recent comments about India as
the ‘Tariff abuser, dead economy, Maharaja of tariffs, most strenuous and
obnoxious non-monetary Trade Barriers' coupled with Trump’s overall insulting
& bullying attitude caused a huge reaction in Indian media and political
circles. Earlier, Trump’s repeated comments about his mediation role in the recent
India-Pakistan mini war (Operation Sindoor) in exchange for a good US trade
deal to both nations have also tarnished the strong nationalistic leadership
appeal of India’s PM Modi and his political image.
Although Trump sounded less hawkish on August 1,
2025, in a media byte about a reported slowdown in Russian oil purchase by
India, overall, the Indian media is terming it as a typical Trump negotiation
& pressure tactics; Indian officials have denied any such instant move
after Trump’s comments. India’s private and public refineries are now importing
almost 35% of its oil requirements from Russia, against 3% (before 2020), due
to the heavy discount of Russian oil. India now buys almost nil Iranian oil and
has also shifted from US-sanctioned Venezuelan oil to US light crude oil. Most
of the Indian refineries are designed to process heavy crude oil varieties from
Russia and Venezuela.
Trump said
on late Friday (August 1), after he was asked if he had a number in mind for the penalties and
if he is going to speak with PM Modi:
"I understand that India is no longer going to be buying oil from Russia.
That's what I heard. I don't know if that's right or not. That is a good step.
We will see what happens..."
Increasing public and media outcry over Trump
tantrum on India and the resultant domestic political compulsion for PM Modi to
portray himself as a ‘strong leader’ against Trump’s rhetoric ahead of
elections in big states like Bihar and WB, the market is now concerned about
the fate of much publicized India-US BTA (Bilateral Trade Agreement) after the
‘expected’ mini trade deal (MTD) virtually broke down after Trumps’ bellicose
comments on July 30 about India.
On July
30, Trump posted a series of Truths on India:
·
WE HAVE A
MASSIVE TRADE DEFICIT WITH INDIA!!!
·
Remember, while
India is our friend, we have, over the years, done relatively little business
with them because their Tariffs are far too high, among the highest in the
World, and they have the most strenuous and obnoxious non-monetary Trade
Barriers of any Country. Also, they have always bought a vast majority of their
military equipment from Russia, and are Russia’s largest buyer of ENERGY, along
with China, at a time when everyone wants Russia to STOP THE KILLING IN UKRAINE
— ALL THINGS NOT GOOD! INDIA WILL THEREFORE BE PAYING A TARIFF OF 25%, PLUS A
PENALTY FOR THE ABOVE, STARTING ON AUGUST FIRST. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION
TO THIS MATTER. MAGA!
·
We have just
concluded a Deal with the Country of Pakistan, whereby Pakistan and the United
States will work together on developing their massive Oil Reserves. We are in
the process of choosing the Oil Company that will lead this Partnership. Who
knows, maybe they’ll be selling Oil to India someday!
·
I don’t care
what India does with Russia. They can take their dead economies down together,
for all I care. We have done very little business with India; their Tariffs are
too high, among the highest in the World. Likewise, Russia and the USA do
almost no business together. Let’s keep it that way, and tell Medvedev, the
failed former President of Russia, who thinks he’s still President, to watch
his words. He’s entering very dangerous territory!
Overall, Trump’s bellicose comments about India
and ‘romance’ with Pakistan have caused an uproar in the Indian media and
political circle; it would be very difficult for India’s government to continue
trade talks with the Trump administration and offer any major concessions. With
the adverse domestic political compulsion and forthcoming state elections, PM
Modi may try his best to look like a ‘strong’ leader against Trump’s bullying
tactics, not ‘weak’ by ‘compromising India’s national interest’.
Trump’s
tariff calculation on India
Trump is also considering VAT/GST/Sales Tax in
other countries along with tariffs as overall tax on US goods & services,
while setting his reciprocal tariffs. For example, in India, US goods now face
around 17.5% simple average tariffs (MFN) along with IGST 15%, totaling 32.5%
cumulative tax impact. Against this, now Indian goods will face 25% simple
average tariffs vs earlier 3.5% in the US, along with 7.5% average sales tax in
most of the states, totaling 32.5% cumulative tax impact. This is Trump’s
reciprocity in tariffs. Moreover, most of the US service faces 18% GST in
India, contrary to most of the Indian services in the US, which do not face any
sales tax. Unlike most of the major economies, the US has no Federal VAT/GST,
but only around 7.5% sales tax on average in most of the states.
Thus, as an equal footing or reciprocal trade,
Trump wants 0% to a maximum of 10% tariffs on US goods in India, which would ultimately
be taxed around 15-25%. Against this, Trump wants a 20% tariff on Indian goods,
which would ultimately be taxed at 27.5% in the US. Trump also wants full &
free access to US agri/farming/dairy products in India, along with F-35 fighter
jets and more US oil & gas purchases by India. Although India could buy US
F-35 jets and more oil & gas, it will be very difficult for India to allow
full & free access of US farm and MSME products into India due to not only the
survival issue of this sector in India, but also an element of domestic
political compulsion. A full opening of the Indian economy to US goods &
services may hurt both the vote bank (farm & small business sectors) and
also the note bank (MSME/big corporates) of any ruling political party (in
power), as both these sectors are enjoying protectionist policies instead of
political patronage.
Indian policymakers have to reform and put proper
policy in place, including lower borrowing costs, substantially lower cost of
doing business/manufacturing/production in India, and meaningful real
deregulation to make the economy, including farm and MSME sectors, globally
competitive. But that may be a long-term plan of 25 years (2050) for the Indian
government while at present it may gradually open limited and less economically
& politically sensitive areas for US goods & services.
As part of a potential mini-trade deal, India
reportedly agreed to provide limited access to US farm products into India with
a moderate tariff protection of 10%, while also seeking a 10% universal basic
tariff for itself. But the Trump admin pressured India for 0% tariff on itself
and 20% tariffs on Indian goods, in line with Indonesia, along with substantial
opening of the Indian farm sector for the US, something which India rejected as
‘one-sided deal at gun point’.
India made
a policy blunder in approaching the Trump 2.0 trade deal proactively from day
one.
India may have done a policy blunder by
proactively approaching the Trump admin from day one (January 2025) for a trade
deal, engaging in at least six public meetings. Trump takes this as a sign of
weakness and intensifies his bullying tactics steadily. This happened with
China during Trump 1.0, when President Xi approached Trump proactively for an
early trade deal, and the result was known to all of us. India should now have
followed the current Chinese stance for a tit-for-tat treatment with Trump on trade,
despite having no leverage like China (like rare earth materials). Trump is now
less hawkish on China and more hawkish on India and the EU than in his 1st
term.
The Trump admin may have made a realistic
assessment that, together with China, the US has almost 45% of the global economy
and is dependent on each other for prosperity and development. Unlike Trump
1.0, the US under Trump 2.0 is now seeing China as a big competitor, not
seeking decoupling, but derisking from strategic dependence. China, on the
other hand, is also steadily expanding itself in the last 10-20 years, not only
in trade with other countries to reduce US/EU dependence, but also diversifying
itself from any US dependence, including high techs and aerospace.
India’s
sovereign right to prioritize energy security and criticize perceived U.S.
hypocrisy
Trump’s stance combines economic protectionism
with geopolitical pressure, using tariffs to address the U.S.-India trade
deficit and India’s Russian oil purchases. His August 4, 2025, Truth Social
post escalates this by threatening further tariff hikes, accusing India of
profiting from Russia’s war. India, however, remains defiant, prioritizing
energy security and national interests while challenging the fairness of
Trump’s criticisms. The ongoing trade talks and India’s strategic ties with
Russia will likely shape the next steps, with potential economic and diplomatic
ramifications for both nations.
Trump’s tariffs could slow U.S. economic growth
and increase inflationary pressures, as costs are likely passed to U.S. consumers
and businesses by at least 75-90%; global exporters may also bear 25-10%. For
India, key sectors like pharmaceuticals, gems, and textiles may face
challenges, though India’s domestically oriented economy may cushion the blow. Trump’s
focus on India’s Russian oil purchases may be a tactic to pressure Russia over
Ukraine or to push India toward a trade deal favorable to the U.S. However, its
effectiveness remains questionable, as China and Turkey, also major Russian oil
importers, have not faced similar penalties.
India’s decades-old non-aligned foreign policy and
strategic autonomy allow it to maintain ties with both Russia and the West. Its
refusal to bow to U.S. pressure reflects a growing confidence in prioritizing
national energy needs and economic stability over diplomatic tensions. India’s
argument that the U.S. and EU also trade significantly with Russia (e.g., the EU’s
€67.5 billion goods trade in 2024) undermines Trump’s moral critique. This
suggests his tariffs may be more about trade leverage than a consistent stance
against Russia’s war.
Trump may
impose 100-500% tariffs, i.e., an outright embargo on India as a secondary
sanction for continuously buying Russian oil: Indian oil refineries.
As of August 4, 2025, refined gasoline and petrochemicals
are exempt from U.S. tariffs, providing relief to Indian refiners like ONGC,
IOC, BPCL, HPCL, MRPL, and RIL. This exemption supports their U.S. export
revenues but is tempered by risks from Russian oil import penalties and
potential future tariffs. Refiners are diversifying crude sources and exploring
non-U.S. markets to mitigate long-term risks.
The 25%
U.S. tariffs and Russian oil penalties significantly impact Indian refiners, with IOC and MRPL facing the largest revenue hits
(₹2,000–3,000 crore and ₹500–1,000 crore, respectively) due to higher U.S.
export exposure. BPCL and HPCL see moderate impacts (₹1,500–2,500 crore and ₹1,000–2,000 crore), while ONGC is less affected directly
but faces downstream pressures via MRPL. Compared to RIL (₹8,000–12,000 crore EBITDA hit), state refiners’ smaller
scale amplifies relative impacts. The shift from Russian crude (35–40% of
intake) to costlier alternatives could reduce GRMs by $1–2 per barrel and
increase India’s oil import bill by ₹1T, risking inflation and a 20–40 basis
point GDP drop.
RIL also
faces significant challenges
from the potential 25% U.S. tariff on its direct exports (e.g., ₹3,000–5,000 crore revenue hit from reduced U.S. fuel and
petrochemical demand) and potential 100–500% secondary tariffs on Russian oil imports,
which could increase crude costs by ₹33,000–41,000 crore. The combined EBITDA impact
could be ₹8,000–12,000
crore (5–8% of FY24
EBITDA). RIL’s dual-refinery structure and diversification
efforts (e.g., Murban crude, non-U.S. markets) provide some resilience, but
sustained tariffs and sanctions could pressure margins and stock performance.
Ongoing India-U.S. trade talks and RIL’s ability to adapt supply chains will be
critical. RIL is the biggest beneficiary of Cheap Russian oil, exporting it
almost 100% to the EU, earning a big profit over the last few years, since the Ukraine
war broke out in early 2022.
Now there
are many questions:
·
Whether RIL’s
billionaire Chairman Mukesh Ambani will be able to influence Trump’s decision
by using his personal family relationship with the Trump family?
·
Is it a pure
coincidence that his younger brother, Anil Ambani, is being hounded by the ED,
and at the same time, Trump is screwing the Modi admin?
·
Is all not well
between the Ambani family and the Modi administration?
·
Is Ambani, and
also corporate India (note bank), wants to ensure a viable duopoly in Indian
politics & policies (both BJP & Cong) after more than a decade of
monopoly (BJP/Modi)?
·
Does the Mumbai
corporate lobby want to see the next PM from Maharashtra, ensuring MH interest
rather than only Gujarat (GJ)?
·
Will PM Modi
take retirement from active electoral politics after 2025 on the 75-year age
clause in the BJP?
·
Who will be the
next BJP face as a potential PM candidate-Present Commerce Minister a a smart,
fluent English speaking Technocrat Goyal, or MH CM Fadnavis (RSS Pune lobby
close like Gadkari)?
Indian PM Modi also made a policy blunder by
involving himself quite actively in the US electoral politics by campaigning
personally for Trump 1.0; then Biden won the 2020 election, straining relations
with the Biden administration. Now, Trump again invited Modi to personally
campaign during the 2024 election, which Modi refused. This time, Trump won!
It’s a huge policy blunder for Modi to involve himself with internal US
politics to be ‘Viswa Guru’.
Conclusions:
India
may face stagflation if Trump's tariff tantrum intensifies
The 25% U.S. tariff and potential penalties pose
short-term challenges for India’s economy, with a projected GDP growth
reduction of ~0.5%, rupee depreciation of ~5%, and inflationary pressures (+100
bps) from higher input costs. Employment in labor-intensive sectors like
textiles and auto components is at risk, with MSMEs facing significant
disruption. The potential higher inflation, higher unemployment, and lower
economic growth may bring a stagflation-like scenario for the Indian economy.
Looking ahead, all focus may now be on Trump’s
attitude, India’s domestic political climate, and the ongoing media trial,
which may affect the progress of BTA talks between India and the US. If there
is no BTA between the US and India with lower tariffs (15-20%) by December
2025, the Indian economy may face serious challenges in 2026 with higher USDINR,
higher imported inflation, a weak labor market, subdued consumer spending, and
lower economic growth. Although as an export and financials-heavy index, Nifty
earnings may not be affected too much, potentially higher USDINR may not be
good for the overall economy and Dalal Street. Also, prolonged Trump tariff
tantrums will be negative for export-savvy Indian corporates. India is also
vulnerable to US tech dependency and any potential direct/indirect sanctions.
Bottom
line:
At
projected 1000 EPS for FY26 and 22 fair PE, the fair value of Nifty may be
around 22000; Nifty may slip
to ~22000 by September-December’25, if there is no meaningful progress on
US-India BTA and an escalation in Trump tantrum, leading to deteriorating
diplomatic relation with the US and subsequent direct/indirect impact on
India’s USD inflow (subdued export, remittances, FDIs, FPIs etc).
Technical outlook: Nifty Future, Bank Nifty Future, and
USDINR
Looking
ahead, whatever may be the narrative, technically Nifty
Future (CMP: 24700) now has to sustain over 24600-24500 for a recovery to
25000/25300*25800/26000* and a further rally to 26100/26300-26400/26500;
otherwise, sustaining below 24440, Nifty Future may fall to 24300/24000 and
23600/23350*-23900/23750 and 23400*/23100-22600/22200 and further 22000-21700*
the coming days.
Technically,
Bank Nifty Future (56000) now has to sustain over 55600 for a recovery to 57000/57900 and only after
sustaining 58100, may further rally to 58500/58900-60500/61000 and a further
61500-65750 in the coming days; otherwise, sustaining below 55500-400, BNF may
further fall towards 55000-54900 and 54500/54000-53500/53000 and
52500*-52000/51500 and further 51000/50500-50000/49700 and 49200-47700 in the
coming days.
Technically,
USDINR-I now (87.75) has to sustain over
88.00 for a further rally to 88.50/88.75-89.00/89.50 and
90.00/90.50-91.00/91.50 and 92.50-94.50 in the coming days; otherwise,
sustaining below 87.50-87.00, USDINR may again fall to 86.50/86.00-85.50/;85.00
and 84.00-83.50 in the coming days.
Disclaimer: I
am an NSE-certified Level-2 market professional (Financial Analyst- Fundamental
+ Technical) and not a SEBI/SEC-registered investment advisor. The article is
purely educational and not a proxy for any trading/investment
signal/advice. I am a professional
analyst, signal provider, and content writer with over ten years of experience.
All views expressed in the blog are strictly personal and may not align with
any organization with, I may be associated.
If you want to support independent &
professional market analytics, you may contribute to my PayPal A/C: asisjpg@gmail.com
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