Nifty recovers on hopes of Trump’s India tariff pause extension
·
Trump may impose 25% tariffs on India, but may
also extend it for 90 days (in line with China) for a comprehensive BTA by
October’25
·
Adjusted tariffs & sales tax, US goods now
face ~27% weighted average total tax in India (17% tariffs +15% IGST) vs ~11%
for Indian goods in the US (3.5% tariffs +7.5% sales tax)
· Trump is considering both VAT/GST along with tariffs in trade deals with other countries; the US has no Federal VAT/GST, but states have sales tax ~7.5% average
As of July 29, 2025, the India-US trade deal
remains in negotiation, with no final agreement reached before the August 1,
2025, deadline set by US President Trump for imposing reciprocal tariffs. US
Trade Representative Jamieson Greer indicated that "more
negotiations" are needed, particularly due to India's firm stance on
protecting its domestic market, especially in the agriculture and dairy
sectors. Both countries are working toward an interim trade deal, with a US
delegation scheduled to visit India in August for further talks. The goal is to
finalize the first phase of a bilateral trade agreement by September or October
2025.
Sticking
Points: Major issues include US
demands for market access to agricultural products (e.g., corn, soybeans,
dairy) and India's resistance to concessions on genetically modified crops and
dairy due to concerns for domestic farmers and food security. India is pushing
for reduced US tariffs on its steel (50%), aluminum (50%), and auto parts
(25%), as well as better market access for labor-intensive sectors like
textiles, gems, and jewelry. The US has proposed reducing tariffs on Indian
goods to below 20%, lower than the 26% reciprocal tariff announced on April 2,
2025, which was paused until August 1. India has not received a tariff threat
letter from Trump, unlike other countries, suggesting a favorable stance.
Indian
Stance: Commerce Minister Piyush
Goyal emphasized that India will prioritize national interests over deadlines,
refusing to compromise on sensitive sectors like agriculture and dairy. India
has also signaled readiness to impose retaliatory tariffs under WTO rules if
needed. Overall, India is not ready to negotiate a trade deal with Trump admin
at gun point (like China); unlike many other developed or even advanced
economies, India is not ready to compromise its interest like vote bank (farm
and MSME sectors) and also note bank (protection from foreign competition for
Indian producers/corporates) for getting the US trade deal in a haste. India knows,
the US needs to access its market of almost 145B people desperately and thus
the US has to compromise its interests, not India.
Despite
India not being an export-oriented economy, the US BTA is important for India:
The EU (-$123B) and US (~$122B) are India’s 1st
and 2nd largest export destinations, contributing ~16% each; as an
individual country, the US is India’s largest exporting client (goods &
services), followed by UAE (~42B); Netherlands (~$33B); China (~$27B); U.K.
(~$22B); Singapore (~$22B); Bangladesh (~$15B); Saudi Arabia (~$15B); South
Korea (~$13B); Hong Kong (~12B) and Indonesia (~12B). India’s biggest trading
partner (export & import) is the US (~$189B), followed by the EU (~ $189B),
China (~$133B), UAE (~$99B), Russia ($71B), and Saudi Arabia (~$51B). India has
the biggest positive trade surplus with the US ($56B), followed by the EU
(~$36B), Netherlands ($16.5B), UK ($10B), and Bangladesh ($12B).
India exports ~16% of its total exports to the US
and EU each, while India constitutes only around 3-4% of US imports. The US
exports only around 2-3% of its total exports to India. Further, if we consider
net remittances by NRIs (professionals, skilled/unskilled work force), the US
is India’s biggest source of remittances (~$38B; 28%), followed by EU (~$20B;
15%); UAE (~$26B; 19%); the UK (~$15B; 11%); Saudi Arabia (~$9B; 7%); and
Singapore (~$9B; 7%).
Thus if we combine both trade surplus and NRI remittances
for India, the US is the biggest contributor of inward FX (USD) ~$93B, followed
by the EU (~56BG); UK (~$25B); Bangladesh (~$12B); UAE (~$11B) and Singapore
(~5B). India has to maintain good trading & diplomatic relations with these
countries. There is immense significance of BTA with the US, EU, UK, and even
the tiny neighbor Bangladesh to pay India’s huge net import bills in USD ($) to
leading importers like China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia etc; India runs
substantial trade and current account deficit.
India-US Bilateral merchandise trade reached
$131.84 billion in 2024-25, with India’s exports to the US up 22.8% to $25.51
billion in April-June 2025. Both nations aim to boost trade to $500 billion by
2030 from 2024 levels ~190B; i.e., almost double in five years from projected
2025 levels of ~225B ~20% CAGR against longer term average growth rate ~10%.
While earlier optimism suggested a possible
US-India mini trade deal by July 8 or shortly after, unresolved issues have
delayed progress. A "mini deal" focusing on select sectors like
automobiles and industrial goods remains a possibility, but a comprehensive
agreement may take longer.
An update
on the latest status of the US-India trade deal:
·
Sixth Round Scheduled: A US trade delegation is set to visit New Delhi on
August 25, 2025, for the 6th round of negotiations on the proposed
bilateral trade agreement (BTA). This follows the 5th round in
Washington (July 14-17, 2025), which failed to achieve a significant
breakthrough.
·
August 1 Deadline: The US has set August 1, 2025, as the deadline
for resuming suspended reciprocal tariffs, including a 26% tariff on Indian
goods, announced by President Trump on April 2, 2025. An interim deal was being
targeted earlier before this deadline to avoid or mitigate these tariffs, but
now it’s unlikely.
·
US Demands:
Duty concessions on industrial goods, electric vehicles, wines, petrochemicals,
agricultural products, dairy, apples, tree nuts, and genetically modified
crops. The US also seeks to address India’s non-market economy practices and
digital trade restrictions.
·
India’s Demands: Removal of the 26% tariff, reduced US duties on steel (50%), aluminum
(50%), and autos (25%), and improved market access for textiles, gems, jewelry,
leather goods, garments, plastics, chemicals, shrimp, oil seeds, grapes, and
bananas.
·
India’s Resistance: India firmly opposes concessions on agriculture
and dairy, citing domestic farmer concerns and its historical exclusion of
dairy from free trade agreements (FTA).
·
Indian Position: Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal is optimistic, describing negotiations
as progressing “fantastically” and targeting a full BTA by October-November
2025. India prioritizes national interests, particularly protecting its
agriculture and dairy sectors, and is prepared to impose WTO-compliant
retaliatory tariffs if needed.
Possible
Outcomes: Trump may agree to 20-25% tariffs on Indian goods vs 5-10% on US
goods
·
Tariff
Imposition: The US could issue a tariff notice (25-30%), escalating tensions
and prompting India to either accelerate talks or retaliate.
·
Interim mini
Deal: A limited agreement before August 1 could offer partial tariff relief and
selective market access; very low probability.
·
Deadline
Extension: The US might extend the tariff suspension by another 90 days to
October 2, allowing more time for talks but prolonging uncertainty.
The August 25 talks signal continued engagement,
but unresolved issues—particularly agriculture, dairy, and high US tariffs—may
delay a comprehensive deal. An interim agreement before August 1 remains the
immediate focus, with a full BTA targeted for October-November 2025. India and
the US are intensifying efforts to secure an interim trade deal before the
August 1, 2025, tariff deadline, with a full BTA targeted for
September-October. India braces for potential 20-25% tariffs if talks falter,
but ongoing negotiations, with a US delegation visiting on August 25, suggest
progress. Agriculture, dairy, and high US tariffs remain key hurdles.
India’s
issues about allowing US farm products into the country with zero/lower tariffs
If India allows full access to U.S. agricultural products
with zero or limited tariffs, U.S. farm products could become significantly
cheaper than Indian products in many cases, primarily due to differences in
production efficiencies, subsidies, and economies of scale. However, the impact
varies by product, market dynamics, and non-tariff barriers.
U.S.
Agricultural Subsidies and Efficiency (scale): U.S. farmers benefit from substantial subsidies,
estimated at 44% of production costs in some cases, which significantly lower
the cost of their products. The U.S.
has higher agricultural productivity due to large-scale farming (average farm
size ~46 hectares vs. India’s ~1 hectare), advanced technology, and
mechanization. This results in lower per-unit production costs for crops like
wheat, corn, soybeans, and dairy. For example, U.S. corn and wheat could be
priced much lower, almost half that Indian equivalents due to high yields and
subsidies, potentially flooding the Indian market with cheaper imports.
Current
Tariff Structure: India imposes
high tariffs on agricultural imports, averaging 37.66% (MFN rate), with some
products like food preparations, walnuts, and dairy facing tariffs as high as
100–150%. In contrast, the U.S. applies a much lower average tariff of 5.29% on
Indian agricultural goods. Removing or reducing these tariffs would lower the
landed cost of U.S. products in India, making them more competitive. For
instance, U.S. apples, almonds, walnuts, and cranberries could see significant
price reductions if tariffs (currently up to 120%) are eliminated.
Indian
Agricultural Challenges: Indian
agriculture suffers from low yields, fragmented landholdings, and limited
investment (only 6% of total national investment). This makes Indian farm
products less competitive globally and also fuels a comparatively higher cost
of food for India’s consumers/population. High domestic tariffs protect Indian
farmers but also breed inefficiencies, increasing local prices for some
commodities. If tariffs are removed, cheaper U.S. imports could out-compete
local products, especially in categories like cereals, dairy, and poultry.
Non-Tariff
Barriers and Restrictions: India
restricts imports of genetically modified (GM) crops like U.S. maize and
soybeans, citing food safety and environmental concerns. Even with zero
tariffs, these restrictions could limit the entry of certain U.S. products
unless relaxed. Other non-tariff barriers, such as sanitary regulations and
quality standards, could still increase costs for U.S. imports, though their
impact would be less significant without tariffs.
Specific
Product Comparisons:
·
Wheat and Corn: U.S. wheat and corn are likely to be cheaper due to higher yields and
subsidies. India’s wheat production may already face challenges due to lower
yields in 2025 (e.g., due to high temperatures in February).
·
Dairy: U.S.
dairy products (e.g., cheese, milk powder) could become cheaper than Indian
equivalents if tariffs (currently 30–60%) are removed, threatening local
producers.
·
Fruits and Nuts: U.S. apples, almonds, walnuts, and cranberries are already
competitive, and tariff reductions (e.g., from 100% to 0%) could make them
significantly cheaper than Indian alternatives.
·
Rice and Pulses: India has a competitive edge in basmati rice and certain pulses, but
non-basmati rice and other cereals could face pressure from cheaper U.S.
imports.
·
Seafood:
Indian shrimp exports to the U.S. face tariffs, but U.S. seafood imports are
less significant, and India’s domestic seafood market may not be heavily
impacted.
Economic,
Consumer & Political Impact: Cheaper
U.S. imports could lead to lower food prices for Indian consumers, improving
affordability in urban markets. However, this could severely impact Indian
farmers, particularly smallholders (supporting ~700 million people), who rely
on high tariffs for protection. The influx of U.S. products could disrupt local
markets, potentially leading to reduced incomes for Indian farmers and
threatening food security if domestic production declines. Zero/lower tariffs
on US or any other AE farm products means the erosion of the vote bank and
virtual political suicide by any party in power. Indian farmers, particularly
smallholders, could face severe competition, potentially leading to reduced
incomes and market share. This is a major concern for India’s rural economy,
where agriculture employs nearly half the workforce but contributes only 15% to
GDP
If India agrees to zero or limited tariffs, it
could gain better market access for its exports (e.g., rice, shrimp, spices),
but this would come at the cost of exposing domestic farmers to cheaper U.S.
imports. India may be considering tariff cuts on limited U.S. farm products
like almonds and cranberries, but is resisting concessions on sensitive items
like wheat, maize, rice, and dairy to protect local farmers.
Without tariffs, U.S. agricultural products like
wheat, corn, dairy, and nuts would likely be cheaper than Indian equivalents
due to subsidies, higher productivity, and economies of scale. For example,
U.S. apples could undercut Indian apples significantly if the 100% tariff is
removed. India may negotiate selective tariff reductions (e.g., on nuts and
fruits) while maintaining protection for sensitive sectors like dairy and GM
crops. A “zero-for-zero” tariff strategy on select goods could balance trade
without fully exposing Indian farmers. Indian products like basmati rice and
spices may remain competitive due to their unique quality or lower tariffs
compared to competitors (e.g., Vietnam, Thailand).
If India allows zero or limited tariffs on U.S.
agricultural products, many U.S. goods (e.g., wheat, corn, dairy, apples, and
nuts) would likely be cheaper than Indian products due to U.S. subsidies,
higher productivity, and lower production costs. However, India’s non-tariff
barriers (e.g., GM restrictions) and selective tariff strategies could limit
the impact on certain sectors. While this could benefit Indian consumers with
lower prices, it poses significant risks to Indian farmers, potentially undermining
food security and rural livelihoods. India is likely to negotiate cautiously,
offering concessions on less sensitive items (e.g., nuts) while protecting
staples like rice and dairy.
Trade
Dynamics and Reciprocity:
·
Adjusted tariff
& sales tax, US goods face ~27% total taxes in India on average, against
~11% for Indian goods in the US
·
Similarly, US
services face ~18% GST tax in India against ~0% for Indian services in the US
U.S. reciprocal tariffs (26% on Indian goods,
effective April 2025) aim to pressure India to lower its tariffs. India’s
average tariffs on US goods vary from 17% to 100% or even 200% along with 15%
to 28% GST. The weighted average Indian tariffs on US goods were ~12% in 2024,
along with ~15% IGST meaning ~27% overall tax on US goods and ~18% tax on US
services. On the other hand, Indian Goods were facing ~3.5% tariffs and ~7.5%
sales tax in the US, meaning ~11% and Indian services were facing 0% taxes in
the US.
Thus, Trump may keep tariffs on Indian goods (to
be paid by US importers) at 20-25% current levels against 5-10% on US goods
into India (to be paid by Indian importers). Indian officials are also now
bracing for 20-25% US tariffs on Indian goods. If India does not reduce tariffs
on US farm/agri products, then Trump could also impose reciprocal equivalent
tariffs including GST. The Trump admin proposed 20% tariffs on Indian goods
against 0% on US goods, something which India is not ready to accept.
Why is the
US so adamant about entering India’s farm/agri market?
The U.S. push to sell cheaper agricultural
products to India is driven by a combination of economic, geopolitical, and
strategic factors, with India’s huge 1.4B population and market potential
playing a central role. Primary Reasons for U.S. Desperation to Sell
Agricultural Products to India:
·
India’s Huge Population and Market Potential: India’s population of over 1.4 billion represents
one of the world’s largest consumer markets. Its growing urban middle class and
increasing demand for diverse, high-quality food products (e.g., apples,
almonds, dairy) make it an attractive destination for U.S. agricultural exports.
The U.S. sees India as an “untapped market” for “big-ticket” farm products like
wheat, corn, soybeans, and dairy, which could significantly boost U.S. export
revenue.
·
Trade Deficit Reduction: The U.S. runs a $45.7 billion goods trade deficit
with India (2024 data), and agricultural exports are seen as a way to narrow
this gap. By accessing India’s market, the U.S. aims to increase its
agricultural exports, which have faced challenges elsewhere.
·
Decreasing Demand from Other Trading Partners amid
Retaliatory Tariffs and Market Losses:
U.S. agricultural exports have faced declining demand in recent times from key
trading partners like China, Canada, and Mexico due to retaliatory tariffs
sparked by Trump’s trade policies. For example, China imposed 15% tariffs on
U.S. coal, LNG, and agricultural machinery, and 10% on crude oil and
large-engine cars, hitting U.S. farm exports like soybeans, pork, and dairy.
These three countries, accounting for over $80 billion in U.S. farm exports,
have reduced market access, leading to a projected $49 billion U.S.
agricultural trade deficit in 2025.
·
Global Supply Chain Shifts: Trump’s tariffs, including a 125% tariff on
Chinese goods and 25–50% on Canada, Mexico, and the EU, have disrupted U.S.
agricultural exports, prompting trading partners to source from competitors
like Brazil and Argentina. This has pushed the U.S. to seek alternative markets
like India to offset losses.
·
U.S. Agricultural Surplus: The U.S. produces large surpluses of crops like
wheat, corn, and soybeans, but domestic demand is limited. With exports to
traditional markets declining, the U.S. is eager to redirect these surpluses to
India, where demand for processed and premium foods is growing.
·
Deteriorating Geopolitical Relations and Trump’s
Bellicose Policies: Trump’s
aggressive trade policies, including a 10% baseline tariff on all countries and
higher tariffs on nations with large trade deficits (e.g., 26% on India, 54% on
China), have strained relations with trading partners. These policies, enacted
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), aim to address
the U.S.’s $1.2 trillion goods trade deficit (2024) but have triggered
retaliatory tariffs, reducing U.S. agricultural export markets. India, with its
relatively lower 26% tariff (vs. 46% for Vietnam, 54% for China), is seen as a
strategic market to compensate for these losses.
·
Geopolitical Strategy: The U.S. views India, the world’s largest
democracy, as a key counterbalance to China in the Indo-Pacific, and trade
concessions are part of a broader strategy to strengthen bilateral ties.
However, Trump’s bellicose rhetoric, calling India a “tariff king” and “big
abuser” of trade ties, pressures India to lower its agricultural tariffs
(average 37.7% on U.S. farm products vs. 5.3% on Indian products in the U.S.)
to avoid punitive tariffs. This aligns with Trump’s goal of securing “great
deals” to project strength domestically and geopolitically.
·
China’s Economic Coercion: China’s retaliatory tariffs and its “dual
circulation” strategy (reducing reliance on external trade) have hit U.S.
agricultural exports hard. With China warning countries like the UK against
aligning with U.S. trade policies, the U.S. is pivoting to India to secure a
stable, large market less likely to be swayed by China’s influence.
·
U.S. Agricultural Subsidies and Competitive
Pricing: U.S. farmers receive
substantial subsidies (~$61,000 annually vs. India’s $282), enabling them to
offer products like apples, wheat, and dairy at lower prices. In some cases,
subsidies exceed 100% of production costs, making U.S. goods highly competitive
if India lowers tariffs. For example, U.S. apples could land in India at ₹55–85/kg (zero tariffs) compared to Indian apples at ₹80–150/kg.
·
Pressure to Open India’s Market: The U.S. is pushing for India to cut tariffs on
products like apples, almonds, soybeans, and GM crops, leveraging its subsidies
to flood India’s market with cheaper imports. This is seen as a ways to boost U.S.
farm incomes, which are “in the red” for crops like soybeans and corn due to
global oversupply and reduced export demand.
·
Domestic and Political Pressures in the U.S.-Agricultural
Trade Deficit: The U.S. has
recorded agricultural trade deficits for three consecutive years, a sharp
decline from the surplus during Trump’s first term. This has increased pressure
on the Trump administration to open new markets like India to support American
farmers, especially in politically influential rural states; like any political
country in a democracy, the US rural area/agricultural/farming is a big vote
bank for Trump and his republican party.
·
Trump’s “America First” Agenda: Trump’s policies prioritize domestic job creation
and manufacturing, but agriculture remains a critical sector. By securing
access to India’s market, Trump aims to deliver a “trillion-dollar deal” to
boost U.S. farm exports and claim a political victory, aligning with his
“Liberation Day” narrative for American businesses.
·
India’s Resistance and Strategic
Considerations-Protecting Indian Farmers: India’s agriculture supports ~700 million people (41% of employment,
15% of GDP), and high tariffs (0–150%, average 37.7%) shield smallholder farmers
from cheap imports; Opening the market to U.S. products risks price crashes and
farmer losses, especially for sensitive sectors like dairy and GM crops.
·
Geopolitical Balancing: India maintains high tariffs to ensure food
security and protect rural livelihoods, but it also seeks to avoid U.S.
punitive tariffs (e.g., 26% on Indian exports). India’s cautious approach
includes offering selective tariff cuts (e.g., bourbon, Harley-Davidson
motorcycles) while resisting full agricultural market access.
·
India is concerned about U.S. pressure, as cheap U.S. imports could
devastate Indian farmers and increase import dependency. Former RBI Governor
Raghuram Rajan emphasized India’s need to negotiate carefully to protect its
subsidized agricultural sector.
The U.S.
is eager to sell cheaper agricultural products to India due to:
·
India’s Market
Potential: Its 1.4 billion populations offer a massive, growing market to
absorb cheaper U.S. agricultural surpluses, especially for products like
apples, wheat, and dairy.
·
Decreasing
Demand Elsewhere: Retaliatory tariffs from China, Canada, and Mexico, driven by
Trump’s trade wars, have reduced U.S. export markets, pushing the U.S. to seek
alternatives like India.
·
Geopolitical
Strategy: Trump’s bellicose policies, including reciprocal tariffs (26% on
India, higher on others), aim to reduce the U.S. trade deficit ($1.2 trillion
in 2024) and counter China’s influence by strengthening economic ties with
India.
·
Subsidized U.S.
Agriculture: Heavy subsidies make U.S. products like apples (₹55–85/kg at zero tariffs) cheaper than Indian
equivalents (₹80–150/kg),
giving the U.S. a competitive edge if India lowers tariffs.
·
Domestic
Pressures: A U.S. agricultural trade deficit ($49 billion projected for 2025)
and political need for trade wins drive Trump to target India’s market.
However, India’s high tariffs and non-tariff
barriers (e.g., GM crop bans) reflect its priority to protect 700 million
farmers and ensure food security. Ongoing trade talks (potentially concluding
by October 2025) will determine whether India offers selective concessions
(e.g., on apples, almonds) while safeguarding sensitive sectors like dairy. The
U.S.’s desperation is tempered by India’s strategic caution, balancing economic
and geopolitical interests.
On July
29, aboard Air Force One, while returning from his weekend Scotland tour, Trump
indicated 20-25% tariffs on India,
which would be a concession as India has charged more tariffs than almost any
other country. Trump responded to a report suggesting that India might be
preparing for 20 to 25% tariffs, stating that India had been imposing higher
tariffs on the US as compared to other countries. He further mentioned that all
this would come to an end as he is now in charge.
Trump said
on Indian tariffs: July 29. 2025
·
India has been
a good friend. But India has charged more tariffs than almost any other country
over the years.
·
But now I’m in
charge. And you just can’t do that---
·
I think the
trade deals are working out very well. Hopefully for everybody, but for the
United States, they’re very, very good
·
They are going
to pay 25%. It is very difficult to do
business with India
·
We may charge more
tariffs if they don't agree
·
They can’t do
what they want
Conclusions:
Trump announced India could face a tariff rate of
20% to 25% on its goods, though a trade deal is not yet finalized, ahead of the
August 1, 2025, deadline for reciprocal tariffs. Trump stated, “They are going
to pay 25%,” emphasizing India’s high tariffs on US goods, but noted ongoing
negotiations could alter this rate. But still, the absence of a tariff letter
to India, unlike over 20 other countries, suggests progress in talks, with
India aiming for a comprehensive bilateral trade deal (BTA) with the US by
September–October 2025.
Market
impact: Trump tariff uncertainty, subdued report card, and
LTCGT issues
Nifty stumbled almost 1100 points in the last few
weeks from around 25800 to almost 24600 on Trump tariff uncertainty, subdued
report card by most of the Nifty heavyweights and confusion over India’s Long
Term Capital Gains Tax (LTCGT). There were some reports that Clause 206 of the
Income-tax Bill, 2025, expands Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) to
LLPs/partnerships, even those not claiming deductions, thereby subjecting
long-term capital gains (LTCG) to an effective tax rate of 18.5%, up from 12.5%
under current law. However, individual taxpayers, including retail investors
holding equity or mutual funds, will continue to pay LTCG at 12.5%, as under
existing rules. The proposed change does not affect their LTCG rate. Last year Tax
rate LTCG on the stock market was increased from 10% to 12.5% for all maximum
categories of investors including retail.
But on July 29, the Indian government clarified
that no LTCG hike in the draft Income Tax Bill. The proposed legislation, aimed
at overhauling and modernizing the Income Tax Act, 1961, has received over 332
suggestions from the parliamentary select committee. As per the parliamentary
agenda, the Bill is slated to be passed during the ongoing monsoon session
itself. As the draft Income Tax Bill, 2025, undergoes parliamentary scrutiny,
it has sparked concerns among tax practitioners about a possible increase in
the long-term capital gains (LTCG) tax on Limited Liability Partnerships
(LLPs)—despite government assurances that no structural or rate changes are
being proposed.
The Income
Tax Department has categorically clarified that the new Bill does not include
any change in tax rates: “As
explained in our FAQs, the Income Tax Bill, 2025 primarily aims at language
simplification, removal of redundant/obsolete provisions, consolidating the
existing provisions without any structural or policy changes and without
disturbing the long-settled taxation principles,”
Eventually, on July 29, Nifty recovered from the 24600
short-term technical support zone on the easing of the Trump trade war and
LTCGT uncertainty. Trump made a trade deal with the EU, which almost confirmed a
90-days China tariffs pause along with India’s. Also Jane Street (JS) saga shock may be over
for India’s Dalal Street as SEBI may allow JS to resume trading soon after
getting a hefty initial fine; SEBI may also go slow on this issue and overall
FNO structure reforming of India’s Dalal Street as it has to maintain the
financial stability.
Technical
outlook: Nifty Future and Bank Nifty Future
Looking
ahead, whatever may be the narrative, technically Nifty
Future (CMP: 24700) now has to sustain over 24600-24500 for a recovery to
25000/25300*25800/26000* and a further rally to 26100/26300-26400/26500;
otherwise, sustaining below 24440, Nifty Future may fall to 24300/24000 and
23600/23350*-23900/23750 and 23400*/23100-22600/22200 and further 22000-21700*
the coming days.
Technically,
Bank Nifty Future (56000) now has to sustain over 55600 for a recovery to 57000/57900 and only after
sustaining 58100, may further rally to 58500/58900-60500/61000 and a further
61500-65750 in the coming days; otherwise, sustaining below 55500-400, BNF may
further fall towards 55000-54900 and 54500/54000-53500/53000 and
52500*-52000/51500 and further 51000/50500-50000/49700 and 49200-47700 in the
coming days.
Disclaimer: I am an NSE-certified Level-2 market professional (Financial Analyst- Fundamental + Technical) and not a SEBI/SEC-registered investment advisor. The article is purely educational and not a proxy for any trading/investment signal/advice. I am a professional analyst, signal provider, and content writer with over ten years of experience. All views expressed in the blog are strictly personal & independent and may or may not match with any organization with, I may be associated.
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